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THE CLASS ACTION AS TRUST
Sergio J. Campos *
Abstract: The class action is controversial because the class attorney can litigate or settle
the claims of the class members without their consent. Many scholars have turned to
corporate law to address the potentially disloyal behavior of the class attorney. These
scholars have used analogies to corporate law to support (1) the use of opt-out rights and (2)
restrictions on class conflicts to constrain class attorneys, and the law has generally mirrored
both requirements. In practice, however, both of these requirements have undermined the
efficacy of the class action and prevented the class action from being used in many
appropriate settings.
This Article argues that a more useful model for the class action is the trust. Unlike the
shareholders of a corporation, the beneficiaries of the trust typically cannot exercise control
over the trustee. Moreover, unlike the corporation, trust law facilitates the creation of trusts
with conflicts among the beneficiaries. These features of the trust mirror the most
controversial features of the class action.
The Article shows that both of these features are necessary to address problems of scale
found in both contexts. Unlike in the corporate context, both the trust and class action
contexts lack a well-developed market for managerial control which would allow
beneficiaries/class members with conflicting interests to cede control to a third party with
better aligned interests. In the absence of such a market, retaining control among the divided
beneficiaries/class members prevents them from investing in the res/claims at the right scale.
Accordingly, trust law shows that class action requirements such as opt-out rights and
class cohesion are misguided. The article concludes by applying the trust model of the class
action to such class action issues as the ascertainability of class members, settlement pressure
on the defendants, and cy pres awards.
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INTRODUCTION
The class action is one of the most controversial procedures in civil
litigation. 1 This is because the class action allows the class attorney to
litigate and settle the claims of the class members without their consent.2
Courts and scholars have expressed concern that the class attorney may
enter into suboptimal settlements to the detriment of the class members 3
or fail to treat the individual class members fairly. 4
1. Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 599, 635 (2015) (“It is no secret that class actions are deeply controversial.”).
2. See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the class action “is
controversial and embattled” because “[t]he control of the class over its lawyers usually is
attenuated, often to the point of nonexistence”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and
Allocation After Amchem Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their
Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1549–50 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2015) (“Both courts and scholars have expressed concern
about what they see as the pathologies of the modern class action, among which is the threat posed
by the controversial procedure to the constitutionally protected interests of those passive
claimants.”); cf. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 313 (2011) (arguing against advance consent to settle a claim in aggregate
settlements because “[w]hether to develop or use that claim at all is, of course, the individual’s
choice”).
3. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:
Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1390–91 (2000) (discussing sweetheart
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Many scholars have looked to the law of corporations to address the
potential for abuse by the class attorney. Some scholars have directly
analogized the class action to a corporation or similar entity. 5 Others
have used the literature on agency costs in corporate law. 6 Generally,
these scholars have argued in favor of opt-out rights for class members
in class actions involving damage claims. Analogizing the class
members to the shareholders in a corporation, they have argued that opt-

settlements). This concern with class attorneys selling out the class has a long history. See
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (noting that a
class attorney may have an incentive to accept a suboptimal settlement, stating that “a juicy bird in
the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger one in the bush, attainable only after years
of effort not currently compensated and possibly a mirage”).
4. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (rejecting class action settlement
of asbestos claims because “the interests of those within the single class are not aligned”); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1649, 1684 (2008) (arguing that class actions should not be certified where there are conflicts which
“give rise to a significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in
some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for
reasons unrelated to evaluation of the relevant claims”).
5. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
921 (1998) (presenting an “entity” theory of the class action which analogizes the class action to
“congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations . . . municipalities and other
governmental entities”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 369, 385 (2012) [hereinafter Issacharoff, State Authority] (analogizing the class action to
the Venetian commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed only for the
duration of a single trading mission” (quoting DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY
NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012))). The class action
has also been analogized to a sovereign state. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy
in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 338 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Governance]
(“[I]t is useful to think of the class action mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device
designed to accomplish some of the same functions as performed by the state.”).
6. The scholar most associated with using the agency cost literature in the corporate law context
to examine the class action is John Coffee, Jr., whose class action scholarship has been enormously
influential. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 377 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee,
Accountability] (noting that “the academic literature on complex litigation has not analyzed class
actions in these agency cost terms”); John C. Coffee Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation] (“It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest
between attorney and client can arise in class action litigation. In the language of economics, this is
an ‘agency cost’ problem.”). Others have also analyzed the class action in agency cost terms, most
notably Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, although Macey and Miller do not analogize the class
action to the corporation. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991) (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976)) (“The lawyer’s role as agent of the client can be analyzed from an economic perspective
with modern tools of agency cost theory”). Indeed, this Article does not criticize the use of the
agency cost literature per se, but the use of corporate analogies based on this literature.
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out rights allow class members to assert some control over their claims,
and thus provide a check against a potentially disloyal class attorney. 7
They have also argued in favor of avoiding significant class conflicts to
prevent unfair treatment of some class members over others.8 The law
on class actions has generally mirrored the proposed reforms of these
corporate law-influenced scholars, requiring opt-out rights for damage
class actions 9 and that such class actions can only be certified if the class
is “sufficiently cohesive.” 10
The turn to corporate law, particularly its literature on agency costs,
has significantly influenced class action scholarship. 11 In fact, the

7. The scholar most associated with using corporate law to advocate for opt-out rights is John
Coffee, Jr. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 308–09 (2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Governance] (analogizing opt-out rights
to the selling of shares in the corporate context, arguing that they may be a “powerful tool in
litigation governance”); JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND
FUTURE 83 (2015) [hereinafter COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION] (arguing that “increased
opting out benefits all plaintiffs because it may constitute an effective accountability mechanism by
which class members can discipline their counsel”); Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 419
(arguing for “enhancing the right to exit” to check the loyalty of the class attorney); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1447, 1465
(1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars] (stressing the importance of the right to opt out in mass tort
cases).
8. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 435 (arguing that “a more rigorous definition of class
cohesion should apply in the case of the mandatory class action where the class member is
essentially being coerced into participation”); see also Issacharoff, Governance, supra note 5, at 385
(using a governance model to argue for a modified cohesion, noting that “[t]he key is that a
supervising court must be assured at the threshold stage of the litigation that there are no structural
allegiances of class counsel that would create incentives to favor one part of the class over another,
or be biased against seeking the best possible return to a defined subset of claims”).
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that for classes certified under 23(b)(3),
“the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances”);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (concluding that “individualized
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)” because of the “procedural protections attending the
(b)(3) class—predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out” (emphasis
added)).
10. The insistence on class cohesions stems from the Supreme Court’s review of comprehensive
class action settlements of asbestos claims in the 1990s. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that the federal class action rule, Rule 23, tests “whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation”). The requirement has
been emphasized in recent cases. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 (2013) (noting that “the focus of the predominance inquiry
under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation’” (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623)); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __ U.S. __, 133
S. Ct. 1426, 1436 (2012) (same).
11. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 113 (2006) (noting that, due to
the work of Coffee, as well as Macey and Miller, “in legal academia, the dominant story was agency
costs”); William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57
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American Law Institute’s recent Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation uses the agency cost literature in the corporate context both to
support opt-out rights in class actions involving damage claims and to
recommend against the certification of such class actions when
“structural conflicts” exist. 12
However, these reforms have had disastrous results for class actions
involving damage claims. Even supporters of opt-out rights have
conceded that such rights can cause collective action problems, which
undermine beneficial settlements. 13 Moreover, the class cohesion
requirement has made it difficult to certify even litigation involving
small claims because in many cases, the claims lack “some glue
holding” them together. 14 This is ironic because the Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.” 15
In analyzing the agency costs that may arise between the class
attorney and the class members, scholars have ignored the trust and its

VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2161–62 (2004) (noting that “in the past twenty years, scholars loosely
associated with the law and economics movement—most centrally, Professor John Coffee—have
sketched a competing portrayal of class counsel” as profit-driven and that “the problem presented
by entrepreneurial lawyering can be understood in terms of agency costs”).
12. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES] (noting that “[t]his Section addresses the problem of
agency failure in aggregate proceedings by establishing adequate representation as a goal and by
identifying tools that can be used to help ensure it,” citing literature on the agency costs of corporate
control); id. § 1.05(c)(7) & cmt. j (arguing that class members should have a right to opt out to allow
“escape from unwanted representation”); id. § 2.07(a)(1) (stating that, to protect the rights of
individual class members, a court should determine that “there are no structural conflicts of
interest”); id. § 2.07 cmt. c (supporting restrictions on “structural conflicts” by stating that “[w]ithin
corporations, for example, shareholders may sell their shares (an exit right), participate in corporate
governance (a voice right), or leave the management of the corporation to various agents obliged to
advance corporate interests rather than their own (a loyalty right). As elaborated in the Comments
that follow, aggregate litigation by way of a class action calls for an analogous array of
rights . . . .”).
13. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 143–47 (2007)
(noting that the inclusion of back-end opt outs in a global settlement of fen-phen claims resulted in
an unraveling of the settlement); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 622 (2012) (noting that opt-out rights for class actions with high variance claims result in
“adverse selection” which may unravel the class).
14. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 339 (vacating certification of class action of female
employees with small claims asserted against Wal-Mart).
15. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.
1997)).
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unique features. 16 In part this is because scholars have tended to lump
together all organizational forms that separate ownership and control
rights. 17 Moreover, the scholars who have applied the corporate law
literature on agency costs to the class action context are also corporate
law scholars. 18 Finally, the trust has only recently been subject to
functional analysis by scholars. 19
But in ignoring the trust, scholars have overlooked a more analogous
organizational form to the class action. For example, although scholars
and courts have bemoaned the lack of direct control the class members
can exercise over the class attorney, a similar lack of direct control is a
defining feature of the trust. 20 This lack of direct control distinguishes
the trust from the corporation, which allows shareholders to choose
corporate directors and officers. 21 In addition, despite the prohibition on
conflicts among class members, conflicts are pervasive in all class

16. Apart from my own work, the only exception is Martin Redish and Megan Kiernan, who have
analogized the class action to a trust, but only for the limited purpose of preclusion. See Martin H.
Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class
Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1676–77 (2014)
(discussing the “limited nature” of their model).
17. See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (referring to “the
economic literature on agency relationships” without distinguishing among different relationships).
18. For example, along with his work on class actions, John C. Coffee has written extensively on
corporate law, including serving as a reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 1984). Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have also
written extensively on corporate law. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY &
DOUGLAS K. MOLL, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
(12th ed. 2014); GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE (2014).
19. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998); Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic
Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855 (2012); John H. Langbein,
The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).
20. Admittedly, the terms of the trust instrument may permit the beneficiaries to exercise direct
control over the trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1958). However, as a default, beneficiaries cannot exercise control over the trustee, and “the trustee
is not ordinarily subject to the control of the beneficiary.” WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER
KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION § 2.3.3, at 36
(2003).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that the
board of directors of a corporation is subject to the control of the shareholders “with regard to the
appointment and removal of its members. Directors are elected by the stockholders, who can refuse
to re-elect them at the end of their terms of office and, in certain circumstances, can remove them
prior thereto.”).
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actions, 22 and unlike corporate law, trust law uniquely facilitates the
creation and maintenance of trusts with beneficiaries who have
conflicting interests. 23 These shared features of the class action and the
trust provide a clue that the trust, rather than the corporation, may serve
as a more useful model for the class action.
This Article looks to the trust as a guide for understanding and
reforming the class action. 24 Admittedly, the trust and the class action
differ in important ways. The trust comes into being by a private party,
the settlor, while the class action is judicially created. Moreover, there is
no analogue for the defendant in the trust context. Nevertheless, the trust
is useful for designing the class action because the features they do share
are necessary to address a problem commonly found in both contexts.
Although controversial, it is generally understood that the class action
addresses a problem of scale. One “policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism” is to enable litigation involving numerous small
claims against a single defendant, where the individual claimants lack an
incentive to bring their small claims at all.25 The claimants would have
an incentive to bring an action if they could share the costs of
investments in common issues, thereby using economies of scale to
make litigation worthwhile. 26 However, the claimants fail to do so

22. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2009)
(noting that “the reasons that class actions are thought to be necessary invariably generate the very
conflicts of interest, either among class members or between class members and class counsel, that
the traditional view of adequate representation forbids”).
23. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 650–51 (noting that, unlike corporate law and other forms of
organizational law, “[t]rust law facilitates the creation of residual claimants with interests adverse to
each other” and imposes a unique “duty of impartiality” on trustees to account for these interests);
see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
405 (1983) (“The preferences of one class of participants are likely to be similar if not identical [in
corporations]. This is true of shareholders especially, for people buy and sell in the market so that
the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogeneous group with respect to
their desires for the firm.”).
24. Here I build on my previous work analogizing the class action to a trust. See Sergio J.
Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565–74 (2014) [hereinafter Campos,
Justiciability]; Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1077–79
(2012) [hereinafter Campos, Mass Torts]; Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 751, 772, 775–77 (2012) [hereinafter Campos, Proof].
25. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). This Article focuses on class actions for damages, which
are typically certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). However, many of the
arguments made here extend to other types of class actions as well, which this Article will discuss
intermittently in the text.
26. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76 (discussing the problem of asymmetric
stakes, or scale, in small claims litigation). The scale problem was first introduced by David
Rosenberg in his work on mass tort litigation. For a recent examination by Rosenberg of the
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because of collective action problems. 27 Moreover, a third party cannot
acquire the claims in a market and thereby acquire the requisite incentive
to invest at the right scale. 28
The class action solves this problem by assigning control over the
claims to a third party, the class attorney, who is incentivized to sue
because her compensation is typically based on the class’s recovery as a
whole. 29 Thus, the class attorney, unlike the class members, takes
control over the claims because she can invest in common issues at the
right scale.
The trust addresses a functionally identical problem of scale in many
typical settings. 30 Trusts are generally created to manage property, the
res, for beneficiaries who lack the ability or motivation to dispose of the
property on their own. 31 Trusts are commonly used when, in the absence
of the trust, conflicting interests would prevent beneficiaries from
pursuing investment opportunities that increase the res as a whole. In a
common example, one beneficiary may have an interest in the income of
a res while another may have a remainder interest in the principal.32 In
such trusts, the conflicting interests of the beneficiaries may prevent
such persons, in the absence of the trust, from pursuing investment
opportunities that would make them both better off but would make one
worse off, such as by depleting the principal to increase income. 33
problem of scale in small claims and similar litigation, see David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier,
Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 305,
305–06 (2014) (arguing that class action treatment is preferable when the plaintiffs are numerous
but their claims share common issues of law and fact).
27. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76.
28. See infra section I.A.1 (discussing restrictions on the alienability of claims, such as champerty
and maintenance).
29. See infra section I.B.3.
30. See infra section I.B.2.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. 2(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (noting that a
“common motivation[]” for using a trust is “to provid[e] property management for those who
cannot, ought not, or wish not to manage for themselves”).
32. AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 816 (3d ed. 2013) (“Almost
every trustee finds that the trust terms require him to pay or apply ‘income’ to or for a temporary
beneficiary, and to distribute ‘principal’ to one or more beneficiaries prior to or upon termination of
the trust . . . .”); see also Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129,
181 (2015) (discussing the “common example in which a trust provides income to the settlor’s
surviving spouse for life, followed by income to the settlor’s children for their lives, followed by
outright distribution of the remaining assets to the settlor’s grandchildren”); Sitkoff, supra note 19,
at 650 (“The still classic example . . . is a trust for the lifetime income benefit of one party (B1) with
the remainder principal benefit to another (B2) . . . .”).
33. See Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 897 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that
a trustee breached fiduciary duty of impartiality to income and principal beneficiaries by failing to
maintain buildings “to make larger income payments during the life of the trust,” noting that “[i]n a
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Moreover, like in the class action, there is no well-developed market for
the beneficiaries’ shares that would allow a third party to acquire control
over both shares to invest at the right scale. 34 Thus, trust law resolves
this problem of scale by allowing the trustee to focus on the total returns
of the res as a whole 35 and equitably distribute the gains, 36 making both
beneficiaries better off. 37
Given their functional similarity with regard to the problem of scale,
the trust can serve as a resource in designing and reforming the class
action. Trust law has the further advantage of providing an existing and
well-developed body of law which can be drawn upon in the class action
context. Indeed, trust law utilizes many controversial features of class
actions to solve the problem of scale, showing that these features are not

sense, the payments ate away the trust’s capital”); Weisbord, supra note 32, at 181 (discussing this
tension, noting that the income beneficiaries “would prefer the trust corpus to be invested in
income-producing assets” while the principal beneficiaries “would prefer the trust corpus to be
invested in equities of firms likely to realize long-term capital appreciation, such as growth stocks”).
34. For example, spendthrift trusts, which prohibit a beneficiary from alienating his or her
beneficial interest in the res, “and similar asset protection devices command huge amounts of capital
in modern America.” See Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust
Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 355, 360 (2009). In fact, spendthrift trusts are the default
form of trust in some states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3536(a) (West 2016); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS L. § 7-1.5 (McKinney 1967) (with respect to income only); see also JESSE
DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF, & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 695 & n.18
(9th ed. 2013) (citing these two statutes as examples of laws which make trusts presumptively
spendthrift). Given the proliferation of spendthrift trusts and other “doctrinal impediments designed
to give effect to the settlor’s dead-hand interests,” it is no surprise that there is a “lack of a thick
secondary market for trust residual claims.” Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 566 (2003).
35. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT §§ 2–3 (1994) (permitting trustee to invest so as to focus on
the total return on the trust property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INV’R RULE
§ 227(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1992) (same).
36. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104(a) & cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 1997)
(providing that “[a] trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent the trustee
considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages trust assets as a prudent investor,” and noting
that “[t]he purpose of Section 104 is to enable a trustee to select investments based on the standards
of a prudent investor without having to realize a particular portion of the portfolio’s total return in
the form of traditional trust accounting income such as interest and dividends”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (requiring a trustee to “make an
equitable adjustment, except as preempted or precluded by statute, or as limited by the terms,
objectives, or circumstances of the trust” if necessary to comply with duty of impartiality as to
principal and income beneficiaries).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that “[i]t is
normally advantageous to beneficiaries collectively and therefore prudent for the trustee to seek a
total return that is optimal in light of the trust’s purposes and circumstances,” and thus, in a trust
with both income and principal beneficiaries, “[t]he ideal way of reconciling . . . potentially
conflicting responsibilities . . . is to invest for optimal total return and, if necessary, to adjust
principal and income”).
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as unfamiliar, and therefore should not be as “extraordinary,” as courts
and scholars frequently assume. 38
As I argue below, using the trust as a guide for class actions has two
important payoffs. First, it shows that protecting class member control
over the claims, such as through an opt-out right, is self-defeating. The
fatal flaw of analogizing the class action to the corporation is that, unlike
in the corporate context, there is no third-party market for the class
members’ claims which would allow control rights to be acquired
privately at the right scale. As a result, preserving the class members’
control over their claims only reintroduces the collective action
problems that caused suboptimal investment in the claims in the first
place. 39
Second, by looking to trust law, one sees that the insistence on class
cohesion is not only unnecessary, but harmful. Conflicts among the
beneficiaries are a common cause of the problem of scale both trusts and
class actions address. Indeed the trust, unlike the corporation, accounts
for conflicts among the beneficiaries for this reason. Accordingly,
insisting on class cohesion would close off the class action to the very
situations where it would most be useful, such as in mass tort
litigation. 40 Moreover, the model shows that collective procedures such
as bifurcation and damage scheduling are not only common in the trust
context, but actually prevent the unfair treatment of beneficiaries. 41
Thus, such procedures should be permitted in class actions.
The usefulness of the trust to class action law also extends beyond the
relationship between the class attorney and the class members. Here I
utilize trust law to address a broad range of class action issues, such as
the ascertainability of class members, 42 whether class actions impose
undue settlement pressure on defendants, 43 and the availability of cy pres
distribution to third parties. 44
Part I sets forth why the trust can be useful for understanding and
reforming the class action. Part II uses the model to show that neither

38. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 466 (1980) (arguing that then-recent institutional
reform litigation was not “extraordinary” given “the willingness of past and contemporary courts to
supervise complex institutions” in ordinary litigation).
39. See infra section II.A.1.
40. See infra section II.B.1.
41. See infra sections II.B.2 & II.B.3.
42. See infra section III.A.
43. See infra section III.B.
44. See infra section III.C.
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opt-out rights nor class cohesion should be required to certify a class
action. Part III concludes by extending the model to consider other
controversial issues in class action law.
I.

THE MODEL

A.

Background

The trust model of the class action proposed in this article is based on
an analogy between the relevant parties and property of the trust and of
the class action. Specifically:
•
•
•

the class members’ claims are analogous to the res;
the class members are analogous to the beneficiaries;
and
the class action attorney can be understood as a trustee
over the claims for the benefit of the class members.

Because the model is based on a correspondence between the relevant
persons and property found in both the class action and trust contexts, it
is useful to define generic terms for instances when I want to refer to
both at the same time. Thus, I will use the term “managed property” to
refer to both the res and the class members’ claims; the term “recipients”
to refer to both the beneficiaries of the trust and the class members; and
the term “manager” to refer to both the trustee and the class attorney. 45
Because I am focusing on the rights and duties of the class attorneys
with respect to the class members, I do not discuss the settlor in the core
model, who admittedly plays an essential role in trust law, 46 but as noted
earlier, does not have an exact analogue in the class action context.47
Despite this difference between the class action and the trust, I argue
below that the trust can still be a useful guide, or model, in examining
the function of the class action.

45. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 439 (using the same terms “for
the . . . characteristic parties” and property in trusts and trust-like relationships).
46. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 643 (“The settlor’s intent to create a trust is a prerequisite to
trust formation.”). I respond to potential objections to the lack of a settlor analogue below. See infra
section I.A.3.
47. Nevertheless, in discussing applications of the model, I do discuss the court as a type of “trust
protector” that, like the settlor, can be understood as concerned with the enforcement of the terms of
the trust. See infra section II.A.3. For that reason, I discuss the role of the settlor in the background
section on trusts. See infra section I.A.2.
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But before looking to trust law as a guide for the law of class actions,
some basic background on class actions and trusts is necessary.
1.

Class Actions

There are many types of class actions and similar aggregate
procedures. 48 This article focuses on federal damages class actions
governed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). It does so
because Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are the most controversial use of the
class action, and thus most clearly demonstrate the controversial features
of the class action. 49
In general, Rule 23 provides that “one or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all class
members” if certain requirements are met. 50 A party seeking class
certification must first show that: (1) the class is “numerous”; (2) “there
are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3) the representative
party is “typical” of the class; and (4) the representative party “will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 51 These four
prerequisites, commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation, respectively, must be
satisfied for certification of all proposed class actions. An additional
“adequacy of representation” requirement applies to the attorney
representing the class. 52
In addition to the above prerequisites, the party “must satisfy at least
one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).” 53 Rule 23(b)(3), the
focus of this article, defines a residual category of permissible class
actions that typically applies to litigation involving monetary remedies.54

48. For a discussion of various aggregate procedures, see ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02.
Examples of these procedures include: (1) consolidated proceedings; (2) multidistrict litigation; and
(3) bankruptcy proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a); FED. R. BANKR.
7001.
49. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1088 (taking a similar approach).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
51. Id. 23(a)(1)–(4).
52. Id. 23(g)(2) (“When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint
that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4).”); id. 23(g)(4) (“Class
counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”).
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–
(3).
54. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty &
Mar. Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule
23(b)(3) category); Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1969) (noting that the 1966 amendments that created Rule 23(b)(3) for damage class actions are the
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Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action only if it is shown that (1) common
questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members” (the “predominance” requirement) and (2) the “class action is
superior to other available methods” (the “superiority” requirement). 55
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are typically certified for litigation
involving claims that are too small to be brought individually. Indeed,
the Rule 23(b)(3) category was created precisely to vindicate “the rights
of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.” 56 However, Rule
23(b)(3) class actions are also certified for litigation involving large
claims, such as in securities fraud and antitrust litigation. 57
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are controversial primarily because, as in
all class actions, the class attorney’s development and disposition of the
claims are not subject to the direct selection or control of the class
members. Upon certification of the class action by the judge, the class
attorney, in effect, can seek a judgment that binds all of the class
members without their consent. That is why the class action is
considered a “recognized exception” to the “principle of general
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” 58
Moreover, as evidenced by the common criticism that class attorneys

“most adventuresome of the new types”). Professor Kaplan was the reporter for the 1966
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, which included the amendments creating Rule
23(b)(3).
There are two other permissible categories of class actions, both of which involve situations
where the remedy is, as a practical matter, indivisible with respect to the class. ALI, PRINCIPLES,
supra note 12, § 2.04(b). Specifically, the first category, codified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule
23(b)(2), permits class actions when separate actions “would create a risk of . . . incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,” such as when the plaintiffs seek “final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” which applies to “the class as a whole.” See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2); ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.04 & reporters’ notes cmt. a
(noting that these two provisions are identical). The second category, codified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), permits class actions when separate actions, “as a practical matter . . . would
substantially impair or impede [the nonparties’] ability to protect their interests,” and has been
primarily used in “limited fund” cases in which “claims [are] made by numerous persons against a
fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999) (quoting
Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 23). It should be noted that the problem of scale
discussed here also arises in the first two categories, but this Article focuses on the third category
for purposes of clarity.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
56. Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497.
57. See Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309–10, 317.
58. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
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enter into “sweetheart” settlements at the expense of the class
members, 59 the class attorney also has the power to settle the claims
without the class members’ consent.
The lack of control of the class members over the class attorney arises
from two further features of the class action. First, although Rule 23
designates the “representative party” as the party who is permitted to
obtain class certification, the class attorney is, in effect, the relevant
party who initiates and controls the litigation. 60 Because percentage fees
are the norm in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, class attorneys typically
have the largest stake in the potential recovery, and thus the most
incentive to invest in the claims. 61 Because of this, class attorneys also
typically incur all of the costs in litigating the class action, as the other
class members, including the class representative, typically have claims
that are too small to justify significant investment. 62 Accordingly, given
her incentives, the class attorney is the one that makes investment
decisions concerning the claims, including the decision to litigate or
settle.
Second, Rule 23 permits the certification of a class that is subject to a
binding judgment entered in the litigation without requiring class
members to “opt in” or otherwise consent to inclusion in the class. 63 At
best, in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, a class member has an opportunity

59. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1390–91 (discussing sweetheart settlements).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
61. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.13 cmt. b (noting that “most courts and commentators
now believe that the percentage method is superior” to the lodestar method of determining class
attorneys’ fees); Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
347, 349 (1998) (“Recently, there has been a trend in common fund cases away from the lodestar
and toward a return to the percentage-of-the-recovery method of calculating fees.”). Admittedly, the
class attorney may also be paid under a “lodestar” method, which compensates the attorney based
upon the amount of time spent on the action. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit
for Costs, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 594 (2014). Nevertheless, fees calculated under the lodestar
method are not materially different from what would have been paid on a percentage basis. See
Alexander, supra, at 350.
62. Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the district court finding
that the class representative was not adequate because he or she would not bear the total costs of the
litigation, noting that “[t]he very feature that makes class treatment appropriate—small individual
stakes and large aggregate ones—ensures that the representative will be unwilling to vouch for the
entire costs”); Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 412 (“Client financing of the action is highly
unlikely because of the inherent collective action problem in class actions; that is, a class
representative who expects to receive one percent (or less) of the recovery will not logically finance
one hundred percent of the action’s costs.”).
63. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419,
1449–50 (2003) (noting that Rule 23 does not require the parties to “opt in” to the class action, but
arguing that such an “opt in” should be necessary for class action settlements).
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to opt out of the class action, 64 or at least object to a proposed
settlement. 65 Given that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions typically involve
small claims, few class members either opt out or object and typically
have no incentive to do either given the small amount at stake. 66
Accordingly, the lack of both opportunities and incentives for the class
members to either exit the class or voice their concerns gives the class
attorney free rein to develop the claims as she sees fit.
Nevertheless, the class attorney is restrained in how she can dispose
of the property in two important ways. First, the law of champerty and
maintenance generally prohibits all claim holders from either selling all
or part of their claims to third parties (champerty) or otherwise
“receiving improper aid from a stranger to the case (maintenance).”67
Admittedly, there are exceptions, such as the subrogation of claims 68 and
contingency fee arrangements, 69 which allow a partial interest in the
claims to be alienated. Nevertheless, class attorneys typically cannot sell
the claims, or a share of the claims, to any third party other than the
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (requiring a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to
provide notice “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”).
65. Id. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under
this subdivision (e) . . . .”).
66. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1563 (2004) (noting
that, based on an empirical study, “the percentage of opt-outs and objectors are almost always
small,” and that “[c]lass members appear to be behaving out of apathy or rational ignorance rather
than making a considered choice not to opt out or object”).
67. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 66 (2011) (discussing and
criticizing the law of champerty and maintenance); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15
(1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return
for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or
champerty.”).
68. Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Improving Medical Malpractice Law by Letting
Health Care Insurers Take Charge, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 539, 539 (2011) (defining “insurance
subrogation” and arguing that insurers should not be limited in what they can recoup).
69. Sebok, supra note 67, at 99–100 (noting that contingency agreements were “flatly illegal
under the doctrines of maintenance and champerty,” but that “[c]ourts and legislatures quickly
found an exception”). In addition, a number of jurisdictions have begun to experiment with thirdparty financing of claims, in effect relaxing champerty and maintenance restrictions. See Michele
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2816–18 (2012) (discussing “claim funding” by third parties in
Australia and the United Kingdom and noting that it “is considered a fledgling industry in the
United States”). Over time, greater relaxation of such restrictions may create the market for claims
that currently does not exist. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition:
Replacing Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1344 (2016)
(noting that while the law has moved away from champerty and maintenance restrictions, “these
doctrines continue to exist in many jurisdictions and pose a serious obstacle to any alienation of
legal claims”).
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defendant through a settlement. As a result, class attorneys rely
predominantly on debt financing to fund their investments. 70
Second, even in a settlement, Rule 23 requires the class attorney to
seek approval for any settlement of the class members’ claims in a
fairness hearing. 71 In such a fairness hearing, the court examines
whether the proposed settlement “is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 72
Accordingly, any proposed sale of the claims to the defendant in a
settlement is subject to the scrutiny and approval of the court.
2.

Trusts

Like the class action, there are a wide variety of trust and trust-like
arrangements. 73 For reasons discussed in more detail in the next section,
this article focuses on expressive, or donative, trusts under United States
law. 74
A donative trust is created when a settlor conveys the trust property,
the res, to a trustee for the benefit of others, the beneficiaries.75
Specifically, the settlor assigns dispositive control, otherwise known as
legal title, over the res to the trustee, while the residual benefits of the
res, often referred to as the equitable interest, redound to the
beneficiaries. 76 The trust, like the corporation and other organizational
forms, separates the control of property from the benefits produced by
the property. 77
70. Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in Representative
Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 563 (2014) (“The prohibitions encompassed in the barratrychamperty-maintenance troika basically restrict the ability to raise money for legal ventures through
equity financing.”). Admittedly, attorneys can, and often do, receive some equity financing from
other attorneys. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 389–90 (2014). Nevertheless, debt financing remains the dominant mode of
financing. See Issacharoff, supra, at 563.
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
72. Id. 23(e)(2).
73. Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 (discussing other “trust-like” arrangements).
74. See infra section I.A.3.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (defining a trust and the
roles of the settlor, trustee, beneficiary and the “trust property”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (same).
76. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 440.
77. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 627 (“We treat the trustee as the new owner for the purpose
of managing the property, while the trust deal strips the trustee of the benefits of ownership.”);
Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333–35 (2002)
(“In operation, the two entities, corporation and trust, were analogous in the separation of legal title
from beneficial interest and in the separate, continued existence of the structure whether in trust or
in corporate form.”); cf. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (citing
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The trust, however, differs from the corporation in two important
respects. First, and most importantly, the trustee is not, as a default,
subject to the will of the beneficiaries, although the trustee nevertheless
owes the beneficiaries a fiduciary duty to manage the res in their
interest. 78 In contrast, in a corporation, “the shareholders can vote to
elect or remove the corporation’s directors; they may also vote to amend
the corporation’s bylaws, or to approve a significant transaction such as
a merger.” 79 Second, the trustee must comply with the terms of the trust
instrument. Indeed, the intent of the settlor in creating the trust, which is
reflected in the trust instrument, has been understood as the “polestar”
that “guide[s] all aspects of trust administration.” 80
Like the class action, there is not a well-developed market for the
beneficiary’s shares in the trust property. Beneficial interests in trusts do
not tend to attract buyers because trust law typically makes it difficult to
deviate from “the settlor’s dead-hand interests” as reflected in the trust
instrument. 81 In fact, in spendthrift trusts, which are still the default in
some states, 82 the beneficiaries’ interest in the res cannot be sold at all.83
The terms of the spendthrift trust are analogous to the champerty and
maintenance restrictions on the class members’ claims.

literature on “agency relationships” in which the “ownership of assets and control of their
disposition [are] separated,” including trusts).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that,
unlike in the context of a corporation, a trustee “may or may not be subject to the beneficiary’s
control”); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 20, § 2.3.3, at 36 (noting that “the trustee is not
ordinarily subject to the control of the beneficiary.”) Again, it should be noted that this is simply a
default rule, and that a settlor may permit some beneficiary control in the trust instrument. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“[M]any (but not all) of
trust law consists of ‘default rules,’ as opposed to mandatory or restrictive rules, and is therefore
subordinate to the terms (or ‘law’) of the trust.”). For now I will focus on the default rule, although I
will explain later in the article why focusing on the default rules of trust law is appropriate for
purposes of developing the model. See infra section I.A.3.
79. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 13:1,
22:13 (3d ed. 2010).
80. Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2640 (2011) (quoting In re Sherman Trust, 179 N.W. 109, 112 (Iowa
1920)).
81. Sitkoff, supra note 34, at 566.
82. DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF, & LINDGREN, supra note 34, at 695 (“In Delaware . . . all trusts are
presumptively spendthrift, and in New York all trusts are presumptively spendthrift with respect to
income.”) (citations omitted).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152–53 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (defining “a
spendthrift trust” as a trust which has a “valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of
the interest of the beneficiary”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(providing that such trusts are valid).
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Method

The model developed in this article analogizes class actions to trusts.
Analogizing the class action to other organizational forms is a common
method of scholarship on the class action, if not legal reasoning in
general. 84 Scholars have analogized class actions to corporations, 85 labor
unions, 86 states, 87 and even the Venetian commenda. 88
This Article analogizes the class action to the trust, in part, to identify
the inconsistent treatment of class actions as compared to trusts. Thus,
this Article leverages the general acceptability of the trust to show that
similar features found in the class action should not be considered either
controversial or “extraordinary.” 89
Analogizing class actions to trusts has additional advantages. First,
trusts, as creatures of equity, are primarily the product of judge-made
law. 90 Consequently, the trust improves upon other analogous forms like
84. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996) (“[L]egal argument is often associated
with its own distinct method, usually referred to as ‘reasoning (or argument) by analogy’; indeed, if
metaphor is the dreamwork of language, then analogy is the brainstorm of jurists’-diction.”).
85. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422 (“The potential for enhanced accountability in
class actions can probably best be assessed by contrasting class action procedures with the
comparable accountability mechanisms in corporate law. Strong analogies exist.”); Shapiro, supra
note 5, at 921 (presenting an “entity” theory of the class action which analogizes the class action to
“congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations . . . municipalities and other
governmental entities”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1465–66 (1998) (noting that class
actions “resemble corporations,” and using this analogy to examine attorney-client conflicts).
86. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 921; see also Coffee, Regulation, supra note 6, at 879 (in discussing
the class action, noting that “it is useful to look beyond the immediate context of civil litigation to
functionally analogous settings where similar problems arise, such as bankruptcy reorganizations
and labor negotiations”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 627 (1987) (“To understand the tensions within the class [of a class
action], it is useful to examine the experience in related contexts—such as collective bargaining
negotiations and corporate re-organizations in bankruptcy—where claimants have also had to
dispute among themselves over the distribution of a limited fund.”).
87. Issacharoff, Governance, supra note 5, at 338 (“[I]t is useful to think of the class action
mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device designed to accomplish some of the same
functions as performed by the state.”).
88. Issacharoff, State Authority, supra note 5, at 385 (analogizing the class action to the Venetian
commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed only for the duration of a
single trading mission” (quoting DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012))).
89. Cf. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 38, at 466 (arguing that institutional reform litigation
should not be seen as “extraordinary” given the “the willingness of past and contemporary courts to
supervise complex institutions”).
90. I say “primarily” because trust law is also regulated by state statutes that are informed by
uniform acts. See David M. English, The Impact of Uniform Laws on the Teaching of Trusts and
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the qui tam action, which scholars have used to suggest that the class
action can only be reformed (or even instituted) through legislation. 91
Second, trusts are a quintessential form of private law, and thus avoid
the concerns with “legitimacy” that arise when the class action is
analogized to public law organizations like the state. 92
However, the primary goal of analogizing class actions to trusts is to
use the trust as a guide in designing the class action. Indeed, those
scholars who look to corporate law and its agency cost literature do so
precisely for guidance in reforming the class action. 93 In using the trust
as a design resource, this Article does not assume that trust law is perfect
nor wade into the intricacies of trust law. Instead, it examines how basic
features of the trust solve certain problems commonly found in both the
class action and trust contexts. These basic features are then used to
create a simple, functional model of the trust, which is then used as a
reference for the class action.
Using a functional model of the trust as a guide in designing the class
action is especially appropriate because the class action is primarily
defined in functional terms. The modern class action, including the Rule
23(b)(3) category, was explicitly designed “on functional lines

Estates, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 689 (2014) (noting that “close to thirty uniform acts relating to
Trusts and Estates . . . have been approved”).
91. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 23–56 (2009) (defining “‘faux’ class actions” as class
actions which provide no compensation to the class members and only enrich the class attorney, and
criticizing them because, unlike qui tam actions, they do not arise from legislation); cf. David
Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 2003 & n.284 (2014) (noting that an “implicit assumption of Redish’s work”
is a “tend[ency] to cast any lawmaking that occurs beyond legislative or administrative precincts as
lacking a democratic pedigree”).
92. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 299,
306 (2011) (analogizing the class action to “political governance” models like the state, and arguing
that “the political governance model . . . . adds a . . . critical dimension: the demand for legitimacy
in the institutional arrangement”); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 625 (2008) (analogizing class actions to
administrative agencies, and arguing that “the reason why the law of class actions must address that
question [of class certification] as one of authority and legitimacy, whereas the administrative state
need not, is this: the administrative state operates based on an ongoing delegation of authority that
stems ultimately from the polity in the aggregate, whereas the delegation of authority effected by
class certification is of a temporary, one-shot nature”).
93. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422 (“The potential for enhanced accountability
in class actions can probably best be assessed by contrasting class action procedures with the
comparable accountability mechanisms in corporate law. Strong analogies exist.”).
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responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation
through representative parties.” 94
As discussed in more detail below, the simple, functional model of
the trust developed here is useful because the trust and the class action
are both used to solve the same category of problems, what I call
problems of scale. 95 Moreover, and as noted above, the trust and the
class action already share certain relevant features, such as the inability
of the recipients to control the manager directly. This similarity makes it
easier to translate any suggested reform from one context to the other.
Finally, the trust model comes with a well-developed body of law that
courts and legislators can look to in reforming the class action.
Accordingly, a trust model prevents one from reinventing the wheel in
designing the class action.
Using the trust as a design resource poses some potential problems
that are worth addressing. First, other trust-like arrangements may be
more similar to the class action. 96 The term “trust” has been used to
describe relationships such as that of the administrator of an intestate
estate to the estate’s heirs, 97 and a guardian ad litem to a person who
lacks capacity. 98
This Article focuses on expressive, or donative, trusts because the
expressive trust has been the primary focus of recent developments in
the functional analysis of trust law. 99 Accordingly, expressive trusts
provide the clearest expression of the functional features of trust and
trust-like arrangements. The trust is also one of the simplest forms of
organization, and its simplicity both facilitates constructing a model, as

94. Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497 (discussing the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that produced the modern class action).
95. See infra section I.B.2.
96. Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 571–72.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 6 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (providing that
“[a]n executorship or an administratorship is not a trust,” but noting that both are fiduciaries, and
that the main difference between the two is “the tribunals which enforced the duties”); see also
Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 & n.108.
98. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.3.3 (5th ed. 2006)
(“A guardian of the property of one under an incapacity is certainly a trustee in the broad sense of
the term, because a guardian is under a duty to deal with the property for the ward’s benefit.”); see
also Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 & n.109.
99. See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19 (taking a functional approach to trusts);
Langbein, supra note 19 (arguing that function of trust is contractual); Sitkoff, supra note 19
(providing an agency cost model of the trust).
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well as avoids any confusion that might result from looking to more
complex forms. 100
It is worth noting that this Article further restricts its focus to the
United States law on trusts, as English law tends to allow beneficiaries
more control over the trustee, and is thus not as analogous to the class
action as the U.S. trust. 101 In fact, U.S. law on class actions, like U.S.
law on trusts, provides the recipients much less control than its European
counterparts. For example, in Europe, class actions typically are
permitted only when the class members “opt in,” or consent, to
participation in the action. 102
Second, much of trust law consists of default rules that can be
customized by the settlor through the terms of the trust instrument. 103
Nevertheless, such default rules are still useful in developing a
functional model of the trust. In general, the default rules of the trust are
not penalty defaults, 104 but are meant to reflect the terms a settlor would
generally prefer in setting up a trust. 105 Accordingly, the default rules
can be understood as a guide to the function of the trust and the
problems it addresses. Moreover, trust law also consists of mandatory

100. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 437 (“The private trust is among the simplest of
the forms of enterprise organization provided for in the law and thus makes a particularly
convenient focus for study.”).
101. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 662–63 (noting that “English law resolves significantly more
of the settlor-beneficiary tension raised by questions of trust termination and modification in favor
of the beneficiaries”); see also A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. TORONTO L.J.
186, 202–03 (1986) (noting this difference).
102. See Coffee, Governance, supra note 6, at 330 (“With only a few exceptions, existing
European class action procedures employ an opt-in rather than an opt-out procedure.”).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“[M]any (but not
all) of trust law consists of ‘default rules,’ as opposed to mandatory or restrictive rules, and is
therefore subordinate to the terms (or ‘law’) of the trust.”).
104. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (defining “penalty defaults” as “purposefully set at what
the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or
to third parties (especially the courts)” (emphasis added)).
105. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 204 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (noting
that “[t]he requirement that a fiduciary act in the principal’s best interests . . . is informed by what
the parties would have agreed if they had considered a given contingency”).
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rules that cannot be changed. 106 These mandatory rules provide further
guidance on the function of the trust. 107
Third, because trust law can be customized, the trust has been used in
a variety of contexts. 108 The versatility of the trust is, in fact, a primary
(if not the most important) benefit of the trust.109 Accordingly, it is
worth emphasizing that the functional model of the trust used here is not
meant to provide an all-encompassing representation of the trust and its
functions. Instead, the model developed here is based on the use of a
trust to address a category of problems—problems of scale. Thus, the
model of the trust used here is limited to this use and is not meant to go
beyond it.
Finally, some features of the trust that comprise the trust model are
not unique to the trust. For example, family firms and other closely held
companies can also contain conflicting interests and also lack a market
for corporate control. 110 As an initial matter, the existence of these other
corporate forms bolsters the argument that many controversial features
of the class action should not be seen as controversial.
Nevertheless, I focus on trust law for two reasons. First, and as noted
earlier, the trust has a general acceptability that is useful in supporting
controversial features of the class action. Second, some of the features of
the trust that are relevant to the model are, in fact, unique to trusts. This
includes, for example, imposing an explicit duty on the trustee to treat
the beneficiaries impartially, which is not present in other corporate
forms. 111
106. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1105
(2004) (“[T]he law of trusts consists overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor who creates the
trust may alter or negate. There are, however, some mandatory rules, which the settlor is forbidden
to vary.”).
107. See id. at 1109 (noting that a class of mandatory rules are based on the presupposition that
“that the settlor propounded the trust and its terms for the purpose of benefiting the beneficiaries”).
108. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 466–69 (noting use of trusts in pension funds, mutual
funds, and for asset securitization).
109. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 98, § 1.1, at 4 (noting that “[t]he purposes for which we can create
trusts are as unlimited as our imagination”).
110. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 (1986) (“On the other hand, investors in closely held corporations lack a
public market for claims. (We refer to claims as shares or equity, but the debt in close corporations
also may be a residual claim.)”); id. at 275 (“[T]he lack of an active market in shares creates
conflicts over dividend policy and other distributions.”). Conflicts can also arise in a number of
commercial settings. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1867 (2010) (discussing examples). I thank Holger Spamann for his comments on this
point.
111. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652 (noting that the duty is “a salient distinguishing characteristic
of trust law as organizational law”).
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The Class Action as Trust

In this section I set forth the trust model of the class action, focusing
on the following elements: (1) the claims are analogous to the res of a
trust; (2) the class members are analogous to the beneficiaries of a trust;
and (3) the class action attorney can be understood as a trustee over the
claims of the class members.
1.

The Claims as the Res

Like the res of the trust, the claims of the class members serve as the
basis for the trust-like relationships created by the class action. A claim
for damages, or a “chose in action,” is generally recognized as a form of
property. 112 A claim for damages, like other “chose[s] in action” such as
“debts” or “contractual rights,” is “an interest in property not
immediately reducible to possession.” 113 Such claims are reducible to
possession once they have been adjudicated in the plaintiff’s favor and
are “merge[d]” into a “judgment.” 114 Claims for injunctive or similar
relief are also generally considered property. 115
Consistent with the functional perspective taken in this Article, here I
focus on the functions performed by claims for relief. An understanding
of the claim as property is consistent with this approach because holders
of claims can exclude the world from litigating the claim. 116 Such an in
112. Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) (noting that a right to a lawsuit, or a
“chose in action,” is “a protected property interest in its own right”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property
interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs.”) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1092 (noting that the
“claim for compensatory damages” is a property interest (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
113. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275 (2008) (citing 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442).
114. Merger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “merger” in civil procedure
as “[t]he effect of a judgment for the plaintiff, which absorbs any claim that was the subject of the
lawsuit into the judgment, so that the plaintiff’s rights are confined to enforcing the judgment”).
115. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 424–25, 430–31 (1982) (concluding that
“[t]he right to use the FEPA’s adjudicatory procedures” to seek, among other things,
“reinstatement” to a job, is a “property interest,” and that property interests protected by the Due
Process Clause “are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating ‘to the whole domain of social
and economic fact’”).
116. This right to exclude others from disposing of the claim manifests itself most prominently in
the Article III context, where, as a prudential matter, there is a “general prohibition on a litigant’s
raising another person’s legal rights.” See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
__ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1, 12 (2004)).
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rem right to exclude is typically considered a defining feature of
property. 117
Claims perform two important functions. The first function is to
enforce what can be called a primary right or entitlement. This function
is apparent in a claim for injunctive relief, in which a plaintiff asks the
court to enforce the law by ordering the defendant to comply with it.
Injunctive relief is generally considered to provide “property rule[]”
protection because it allows the holder of the primary right to coercively
stop individuals from taking the entitlement without the holder’s
consent. 118
Claims for damages also protect primary entitlements, but do so
“indirectly, through the deterrent effect of damage actions that may be
brought once harm occurs.” 119 Claims for damages provide “liability
rule” protection, in which a party may take that primary entitlement “if
he is willing to pay [the] objectively determined value for it.” 120
Second, along with enforcing primary entitlements, claims also
provide compensation for harm done. Claims for compensatory
damages, where by definition the damages are calculated to offset the
harm done to the plaintiff, clearly fall in this category. But injunctions
can also provide compensation. For example, a “reparative injunction”
directly compensates the plaintiff, not with money, but by ordering the
defendant to engage in remedial measures.121 Moreover, insofar as

117. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); cf.
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1792–93 (2004) (noting
that “exclusion is likely to be the predominant element of the method used to define” property rights
given that property rights are rights against “unspecified” persons in the world).
118. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–16 (1972) (showing that a right to be free
from a nuisance protected by a “property rule” permits the entitlement holder to “enjoin [the]
nuisance”); Smith, supra note 117, at 1720 (noting that “property rules” utilize “injunctions . . . [to]
make a nonconsensual taking of an entitlement less attractive than bargaining to a consensual price
with the present owner”).
119. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 357
(1984); see also Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A class
action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective.”). Injunctions
can also utilize claims for damages to deter noncompliance with the injunction. Smith, supra note
117, at 1720 (noting that “property rules” also utilize “supracompensatory damages” to prevent
takings).
120. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 118, at 1090–92. Accordingly, a “liability rule”
effectively assigns a call option to take plaintiff’s primary entitlement, with the strike price valued
at the damages caused by the taking. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS 5 (2005).
121. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 10 (1978) (discussing “reparative
injunctions”).
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compliance with an injunction is enforced through a contempt action,
such a contempt action can mimic a claim for damages if the sanction
sought is used to compensate the plaintiff for harm done. 122
Understanding both the claim’s enforcement function and its
compensation function is necessary to evaluate any disposition of the
claim. Whether a claim should be settled, litigated, or abandoned will
depend on how each option would affect both the enforcement and
compensation the claim provides. Indeed, different uses of the claim
may lead to a different mix of enforcement and compensation. In such
cases, one must evaluate which mix is preferable.
Two things affect the optimality of various trade-offs between
enforcement and compensation. First, many legal violations result in
injuries that cannot be fully compensated through monetary damages,
such as a deceased loved one or a lost limb. For such “nonpecuniary
losses,” no amount of money will buy back what was lost. 123 Given the
possibility of nonpecuniary losses, improved enforcement is preferable
to improved compensation because it is better to prevent such losses
than to imperfectly compensate for them. 124 Second, even in the absence
of nonpecuniary losses, adjudicating claims is costly, and under the
American Rule, the parties bear their own litigation costs.125 As a result,
litigation costs diminish the compensation provided by a claim.
Finally, it is worth noting that claims, and civil liability in general,
may not be necessary insofar as (1) the parties can contract ex ante
concerning the legal violation, (2) market forces sufficiently induce
potential defendants to comply with the law, or (3) the conduct is
regulated by other means. 126 One party, for example, could assume the

122. Id. at 9 (noting that a contempt action for enforcement of an injunction “can properly be
compared to the damage action or criminal prosecution”); cf. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at
1103 (noting that “[t]he correct analogue to the damage remedy . . . is not the injunction but the
contempt action”).
123. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1085 (discussing nonpecuniary losses).
124. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 846 & n.32 (2002) (noting that, given nonpecuniary losses, “[b]y
definition, the costs of preventing unreasonable risk are lower than the costs of compensating loss
resulting from such risk”).
125. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (defining the
“American rule,” stating that “[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser”).
126. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443–44 (2010) (noting that ex ante contracting and market pressure in
products liability contexts may obviate the need for the use of tort liability); id. at 1450–51
(discussing “government regulation” as an alternative to liability); id. at 1486 (discussing
contracting as an alternative to liability).
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risk of injury that comes with a product in exchange for a lower price. 127
This Article assumes that, with a few exceptions, the use of civil
liability, and thus the claims themselves, are both socially desirable and
avoid the distortions that arise when liability is unnecessary.
2.

The Class Members as the Beneficiaries

In using a simple model of the trust as a guide for understanding the
class action, I analogize the class members to the beneficiaries. At first
glance, the analogy is intuitive because class members and beneficiaries
typically lack either the ability or motivation to dispose of the relevant
property optimally. A “common motivation[]” for creating a trust is “to
provid[e] property management for those who cannot, ought not, or wish
not to manage for themselves.” 128 Similarly, a common motivation for
the use of class actions is to “vindicat[e] the rights of groups of people
who individually would be without effective strength to bring their
opponents into court at all.” 129
But the analogy is especially useful because the class members in a
class action and the beneficiaries of trusts in commonly used contexts
both share a more specific problem—a problem of scale. The problem of
scale that both the class action and trust share has three features:
(1) the recipients have a divided interest in the managed
property;
(2) the recipients cannot invest in, or otherwise dispose of, the
managed property at the right scale; and
(3) no well-developed or thick market exists for the interests of
the recipients in the managed property.
This last feature is crucial, because it distinguishes both the class
action and the trust from the corporation. In corporate contexts, third
parties have access to thick markets to acquire divided shares in a
corporation, such as through a tender offer, 130 to reap the benefits of

127. Id. at 1443.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. 2(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also
Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 668 (“[T]he donative settlor’s motivation for interposing a trustee between
the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax considerations aside, is often a lack of faith in the
beneficiaries’ judgment.”).
129. See Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497.
130. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 957, 957 (1994) (noting that, in the corporate context, “[t]ender offers or takeover bids are
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investing in firm assets at the right scale. In contrast and as noted earlier,
in both the class action and trust contexts, there exists no well-developed
market for control over the relevant property. 131
In the absence of such a well-developed market, divided control rights
can lead to suboptimal investment. This is because each recipient has
only a partial interest in the managed property, and thus each recipient
lacks a private incentive to maximize optimally the entire managed
property. More importantly, collective action problems can prevent
recipients from acting together to invest at the appropriate scale. This, in
a nutshell, is the problem of scale that the class members and the
beneficiaries in many trusts share; it is no different from the “tragedy of
commons” problems that typically arise when there is divided ownership
of a common good. 132
The problem of scale is readily apparent in small claims litigation, the
typical case certified under Rule 23(b)(3). 133 Suppose that a
manufacturer designed and sold certain models of washing machines
that all suffered from the same defect in their washer drums, and that the
defect resulted in mold growth, noxious odors, and smelly clothes. 134 A
large number of plaintiffs purchased the relevant models, and suffered
from the noxious odors caused by the defect. 135 However, the damages
suffered by each plaintiff are small, not “large enough to justify the
expense of an individual suit.” 136 The injuries (exposure to bad smells,
damage to clothing, costs of repairs or replacements) likely cost only in

used when the ownership of the target company is dispersed, with no shareholder holding a
controlling interest”).
131. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 376 (noting that “what is most distinctive about
the class action is the absence” of “well-developed markets and voting mechanisms . . . to minimize
these agency costs”); Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 654 (noting that “there is no well-developed market
for beneficial interests in trusts”).
132. Specifically, such problems of scale arise when there are spillovers or externalities that the
owners of property fail to account for absent partitioning of the property (to avoid such spillovers)
or collective governance of the property (to capture such spillovers). See Lee Anne Fennell,
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY LAW 35, 35–50 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (showing that commons
and anticommons problems that arise from divided ownership of a common good can be understood
as problems of scale).
133. See supra section I.A.1.
134. This example is based on Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) and
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts, however, have been
stylized for clarity.
135. Butler, 727 F.3d at 798 (“Roughly 200,000 of these Kenmore-brand machines are sold each
year and there have been many thousands of complaints of bad odors by the machines’ owners.”).
136. Id.
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the hundreds, 137 while the filing fee alone for a civil action in federal
court is $400. 138
In the absence of a class action, no individual plaintiff would file a
lawsuit, because “only a lunatic or a fanatic” would sue for such a small
amount. 139 Indeed, for each plaintiff, declining to sue is the rational
action to take.
But the inaction of the plaintiffs leads to a self-defeating result
because it allows the manufacturer to escape all liability for the defect. 140
By escaping liability, the manufacturer pays a much lower price (in fact,
no price) for taking the entitlement of each plaintiff to be free from the
defect. Indeed, the manufacturer, as well as others, will anticipate that it
can avoid liability for defects that cause a small amount of damage to a
large group of dispersed plaintiffs. Consequently, in the absence of
market pressure or other regulation, manufacturers will produce and sell
products with more defects. 141
The plaintiffs could have avoided this result by sharing the costs
associated with developing common issues of liability. For example,
suppose that there is an expert who, for one million dollars, could testify
that the defect shared by each of the models of washers was the sole
cause of the mold growth. No individual plaintiff would pay for the
expert; however if there are one million plaintiffs, then the cost for each
plaintiff would only be one dollar. Accordingly, it would be rational for
the class members to hire the expert and share the costs among
themselves. In fact, had the plaintiffs agreed to share such costs, they
could have used economies of scale to invest in common issues and,
thus, threaten the imposition of liability on the defendant by litigating
the claims. 142

137. Id. at 801 (noting that “[t]he present case” involves “tens of thousands of class members,
each seeking damages of a few hundred dollars”).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012) (filing fee of “$350”); Judicial Conference Schedule
of Fees, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule ¶ 14, http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/77FM-8VE8]
(“Administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court, $50.”).
139. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing class
treatment of small claims litigation).
140. See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 8 (“In the absence of a class action device, such
injuries would often go unremedied because most individual plaintiffs would not themselves have a
sufficient economic stake in the litigation to incur the litigation costs.”).
141. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 126, at 1453–55 (noting that “product liability may be
efficacious” in reducing product risk if market forces and regulation reduces risk suboptimally).
142. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76 (discussing economies of scale in
investing in common issues, using a similar example). For a formal model of these defects, see
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The plaintiffs do not share costs in part because, in the absence of a
class action, a plaintiff suing on her own behalf cannot seek
reimbursement from a later plaintiff who relies upon her work on
common issues. 143 Moreover, while there are no legal restrictions to the
plaintiffs voluntarily aggregating to share costs on common issues, the
plaintiffs would fail to aggregate because of the transaction costs
involved in creating agreements and collecting funds among one
another. 144 Accordingly, in the absence of a class action, the class
members cannot invest in common issues at the right scale, and thus are
disadvantaged relative to the defendant, who can invest at the
appropriate scale.
This same problem of scale is also present in many situations where
the trust is commonly used, particularly when conflicts among the
beneficiaries prevent them from optimally 145 maximizing the total
amount of the res. A common example in trust law, one that “[a]lmost
every trustee finds,” arises when one beneficiary is assigned an interest
in the income produced by the res while another is assigned an interest
in the principal. 146 The income beneficiary generally prefers “incomeproducing” investments while the principal beneficiary generally prefers
“long-term capital appreciation.” 147
Although in this situation there are only two beneficiaries, their
divided interests in the res still would prevent them from investing at the
right scale had they owned the res outright. Specifically, in the absence
Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26 (arguing that class action treatment is preferable when the
plaintiffs are numerous but whose claims share common issues of law and fact).
143. See David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible”
Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 548 n.25 (2011) (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 170 (1939)) (“Although it is possible for a court to require parties who benefit from the
creation of a common fund to share in the costs of creating that fund, the ‘common fund’ concept
has never been extended so far as to require later plaintiffs who sue independently to reimburse
earlier plaintiffs whose cases eased their own paths to recovery.”).
144. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (2003)
(“It is true that class members could achieve these same benefits [of cost-sharing] by organizing
voluntarily. However, the transaction costs of organizing a large group are simply too high.”); see
also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1079–80 (noting the similar problem in mass tort
litigation).
145. I say “optimally” because beneficiaries tend to be risk averse, and thus would prefer
forgoing an investment that was too risky even if its expected value was positive. See Sitkoff, supra
note 19, at 654 (“In the paradigmatic donative trust, the residual claimants are risk averse (imagine
widows and orphans).”).
146. HESS ET AL., supra note 32, § 816 (“Almost every trustee finds that the trust terms require
him to pay or apply ‘income’ to or for a temporary beneficiary, and to distribute ‘principal’ to one
or more beneficiaries prior to or upon termination of the trust.”).
147. Weisbord, supra note 32, at 181.
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of the trust, the persons designated as beneficiaries would forgo
investments that would increase the res overall if that would involve
either depleting the principal or reducing the income of the res. This is
true even if the increase in the total res would more than offset any
decrease in either income or principal. Here, like the small claims class
members of a class action, it is “normally advantageous to beneficiaries
collectively and therefore prudent for the trustee to seek a total return
that is optimal in light of the trust’s purposes and circumstances.” 148
A similar problem of scale can also arise when there is only a single
beneficiary, as when the beneficiary is young and improvident. In
Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 149 for example, a beneficiary of land held in trust
who recently turned twenty-one entered into a contract to sell the land
for what was at most a third of its actual value.150 The Chancery Court of
South Carolina refused to order specific performance of the
agreement. 151 The court noted in particular that “[y]oung heirs even
when of age, are under the care and protection of the court,” and that
“[w]atching for an heir as soon as he comes of age, to get a bargain out
of him, is a catching bargain and will be discountenanced by the
court.” 152 The permissibility of spendthrift trusts also reflect a concern
for young and improvident beneficiaries, as spendthrift trusts are
frequently used when “the [settlor] is concerned that the [beneficiary] is
irresponsible and will too quickly encumber all of the [res].” 153
Young and improvident heirs, in particular, discount future outcomes
too heavily relative to present outcomes. To use more colloquial terms,
such beneficiaries lack “impulse-control” 154 or suffer from a “weakness
of will.” 155 Typically such beneficiaries also lack the experience
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (discussing
income and principal beneficiaries) (emphasis added).
149. 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 250 (S.C. 1792).
150. Id. at 255; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 532 & nn.186 & 190 (1967) (using the case as an example of an
equity court being protective of “the young” and “the improvident”).
151. Clitherall, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) at 263 (holding that the court will “leave the complainant
to his remedy at law to recover his damages for the non-performance of the agreement”).
152. Id. at 256–57.
153. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 452.
154. See IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET
THINGS DONE 12–14 (2010) (discussing “impulse-control” and the “tendency to hyperbolically
discount”).
155. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
67 (1979) (noting that “there are no rational grounds for preferring the present over the future,” but
that “there is the fact of weakness of will. We simply are not always able to follow our rational
inclinations, and the time preferences may be seen as the formal expression of this inability.”).
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necessary to make prudent decisions concerning the property to which
they would hold title were the property their own. 156 In Clitherall, the
young and improvident heir sold the property for far less than what it
was worth because he lacked sufficient information about the potential
uses of the land. 157 Taken together, the improvident beneficiary suffers
from a myopia that focuses on her limited understanding of the present
to the exclusion of the future. Indeed, “improvident” itself means “not
providing or saving for the future.” 158
The lack of foresight of the improvident beneficiary can also be seen
as a problem of scale. Her improvidence can be understood as arising
from an intertemporal conflict between her present and future
preferences—between her present self and her future selves. In other
words, by focusing on her present self, she fails to account for all of her
selves over time. Accordingly, the improvident beneficiary makes selfdefeating decisions that not only harm her future selves, but also current
self, as all of these selves are inextricably intertwined into one whole.
This intertemporal conflict is not materially different from the
interpersonal conflicts found in class actions and in trusts that lead to
suboptimal investments at the wrong scale. Indeed, any intertemporal
conflict can be characterized as an interpersonal conflict.159

156. Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning,
123 Q.J. ECONOMICS 1161, 1162 (2008) (providing a model of parenting by exploring the “basic
trade-off between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to
learn from experience”).
157. See Clitherall, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) at 254 (noting that the heir, in his answer, after the
sale learned from an “intimate friend” that the land was “prime tide land” and thus “was worth three
times as much as the price offered for it”).
158. Improvident, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dict
ionary/improvident [https://perma.cc/NTL4-9HFD].
159. See ELSTER, supra note 155, at 71 (“The absolute priority of the present is somewhat like
my absolute priority over all other persons: I am I—while they are all ‘out there.’”); Jon Elster,
Introduction to THE MULTIPLE SELF 1, 2 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (“The two main strategies for
concept formation in th[e] field [of the multiple self] rely on, respectively, interpersonal and
intertemporal phenomena to make sense of the notion of several selves.”); Stuart Albert, Temporal
Comparison Theory, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 485 (1977) (pointing out the similarity between temporal
behavior and social behavior); Robert Nozick, Interpersonal Utility Theory, 2 SOC. CHOICE &
WELFARE 161, 165 (1985) (“[A] proposal about interpersonal comparisons should, when applicable,
be plausible as a proposal about intrapersonal intertemporal comparisons of utility. It should be
plausible that it yields correct utility comparisons for the same person at different times (when it
applies to yield any comparisons of that sort).” (emphasis in original)). One can also say that any
“internalit[y]” within a person can be understood as an “externality” among different persons. See
Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 698,
700 (2015) (“It is . . . useful to think of internalities as ‘externalities that individuals impose on
themselves.’”).
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Trusts can contain a combination of both externally divided
beneficiaries like the principal and income beneficiaries described
above, and internally divided beneficiaries like the improvident
beneficiary, or one that is not yet born. 160 In such situations a trustee
must contend with both interpersonal and intertemporal problems of
scale. Nevertheless, all of these situations show that the trust copes with
the same problem of scale that the class action is designed to address.
3.

The Class Attorney as the Trustee

Under a trust model of the class action, the class attorney is
understood as a trustee of the claims for the benefit of the class
members. As with class members and beneficiaries, analogizing the
class attorney to the trustee is useful because both the class attorney and
the trustee solve the problem of scale in the same way.
First, both the trustee and the class attorney are assigned dispositive
control over the claims for the benefit of the class members. 161 In both
contexts, assigning dispositive control to the manager is crucial because
it prevents the recipients from exercising control over the managed
property at the wrong scale.
Second, both the trustee and the class attorney are incentivized to
dispose of the managed property at the right scale. In the class action
context this is primarily accomplished though the attorney fee award. 162
Specifically, the fee award aligns the class attorney’s incentives with
that of the class. Because the class attorney’s fee is typically a portion of
the aggregate net recovery of the class members, 163 the class attorney is
incentivized (albeit imperfectly) to make investments in common issues
that maximize the class members’ recovery as a whole. In contrast, no
one class member or group of class members takes into account the total,

160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (permitting a
trust to include beneficiaries that are “capable of ascertainment from facts which although not
existing at the time must necessarily be in existence at some time within the period of the rule
against perpetuities”).
161. See supra sections I.B.2 & I.B.3.
162. Coffee, Governance, supra note 6, at 306 (“From a traditional legal perspective, the courtawarded attorney’s fee is the principal lever by which the law seeks to incentivize the agent to act in
the class’s interest.”).
163. It is worth noting that a trustee may have a partial beneficial interest in the res, but not a
complete beneficial interest. See 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 98, § 2.1.6 (noting that “it is possible
for a trustee to hold an equitable interest in trust”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (noting that “the trustee must hold property for the benefit of one or more
persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee”).
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aggregate recovery of the class as a whole, which leads to suboptimal
investment in common issues given economies of scale. 164
Trust law similarly relies upon structural features like trustee
compensation to solve the problem of scale. For example, like the class
attorney, modern developments in trust law have increased the
discretionary power of the trustee to allow her to make investments that
maximize the total return on the res (subject, of course, to the terms of
the trust instrument). 165 This increase in discretionary authority is often
combined with the use of compensation methods that are based on a
percentage of the res that align (albeit imperfectly) the interests of the
trustee with the beneficiaries as a whole. 166 Such trust compensation is
no different from the compensation typically received by class action
attorneys, and is similarly used to allow the trustee to invest in the res at
the right scale.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL

The previous part set forth a trust model of the class action. This Part
applies the model to assess two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions involving damage claims: (1) each class member must have a
right to “opt out” of the class 167 and (2) the class must be cohesive. 168
The model demonstrates that neither requirement is necessary, and that,
in fact, both are harmful to the operation of the class action. The trust

164. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1079–81; see also David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class
Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 415–16 (2000)
(using a numerical example to show the superiority of the class action to a “joint venture” that only
aggregates a partial number of plaintiffs).
165. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Reform, How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 884 (2010) (noting that recent developments in trust law
based on modern portfolio theory, and “[t]he Restatement (Third), in particular, went out of its way
to indicate that a trustee should have broad discretion in formulating investment strategy”).
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (noting that “[a]
trustee is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for services as trustee,” and that
some state statutes “provide that trustees’ fees are to be based on specified percentages of the
principal or of the income and principal of the trust”); see also Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 199
(noting “incentive-based compensation” as one way of “ameliorating the agency problem”).
167. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (concluding that “individualized
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)” because of the “procedural protections attending the
(b)(3) class—predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out” (emphasis
added)).
168. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97
(2013) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that “the focus of
the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a proposed class is ‘sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’”)).
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model also suggests potential solutions to ensure class attorney loyalty
and to deal with class member conflicts. Indeed, unlike opt-out rights or
cohesion requirements, these solutions are not self-defeating.
A.

Control

1.

Opt-out Rights

A trust model of the class action demonstrates that preserving each
class member’s control over the claim is self-defeating. This is due to a
problem of scale that both the trust and the class action address—the
recipients are divided in such a way that they cannot act together to
dispose of the managed property at the right scale. 169 Because there is
not a well-developed market for managerial control in either context,
protecting the control of the recipients only perpetuates the problem of
scale rather than solves it. 170
Accordingly, giving class members control over their claims by
giving them the right to opt out of the class is not only unnecessary, but
harmful to their interests. Admittedly, opt-out rights are not harmful in
small claims litigation, where the class members do not have an
incentive to opt out because they lack an incentive to file suit
separately. 171 But many class actions that are certified under Rule
23(b)(3), such as securities fraud and antitrust class actions, often have
some class members who have large claims. 172 It is in these settings that
opt-out rights can be, and often are, harmful.
To understand how opt-out rights are harmful, it is helpful to examine
the arguments in favor of opt outs that are based on analogies to
corporate law. For example, John Coffee has analogized opt-out rights to
the exit rights of shareholders in a corporation. 173 Specifically, Coffee
has argued that opt-out rights “discipline[] class counsel by threatening
them with reduced fees if they propose a settlement that is unattractive to
their clients.” 174 Moreover, Coffee has argued that opt outs can be used
to mimic “takeover bids” in the corporate context by allowing for third
parties to propose competing class actions, with class members using the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra section I.B.2.
Id.
Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 28 n.85.
Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309–10, 317.
Id. at 308–09; see also COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 83.
Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 421.
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opt outs to “opt in” to the competing actions. 175 Coffee admits that “an
exact analogy cannot be drawn between the class action and corporate
governance contexts,” but nevertheless concludes that “the idea of a
competitive bid has considerable relevance to the class action
context.” 176
But opt-out rights are ineffective at disciplining the class attorney
against disloyal behavior. As an initial matter, unlike in the corporate
context, the exercise of the opt out right cannot cause the removal of the
class attorney. In the corporate law context, there is a market for control
that allows third parties to acquire control rights over directors and
officers by acquiring the stock of the shareholders. Accordingly, when a
shareholder exits by selling her shares, she also enables a third party to
acquire control. 177 This ability to acquire control, in turn, deters the
directors and officers from acting disloyal out of fear that a third party
will acquire ownership and replace them. 178 In contrast, the opt out right
does not remove the class attorney. It only allows for concurrent,
separate action. Thus, the opt out right does not provide the same threat
of removal as in the corporate law context.
In fact, opt-out rights are not only ineffective, but harmful due to an
important difference between opt-out rights and corporate exit rights. A
shareholder of a corporation who wishes to exit the corporation cannot
liquidate her share in corporate assets. 179 Thus, when a shareholder exits
by transferring her share, the corporate assets remain under common
control. In contrast, the right to “opt out” permits a class member to take
her claim away from the other claims under the common control of the
class attorney and “bring her own suit.” 180 By reducing the assets under
175. Id. at 422–28; see also Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309.
176. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422.
177. For the classic account of the “market for corporate control,” see Henry G. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965) (“The lower the stock
price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over
becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently.”).
178. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (1981) (arguing that the market for
corporate control, “particularly the tender offer market,” “provide[s] incentives to management to
operate efficiently and keep share prices high.”); see also id. at 1198 (“A frequent consequence of a
successful takeover attempt is the replacement of incumbent managers.”).
179. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 394 (2000) (noting that a shareholder of a corporation can only seek liquidation
“when at least a majority of the firm’s shareholders agree”); see also Coffee, Governance, supra
note 7, at 309 (“In the corporate context, when a dissatisfied shareholder sells shares, the
shareholder does not withdraw capital from the corporation.”).
180. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 28 n.85.
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the control of the class attorney, the opt out has the consequence of
“reducing . . . the attorney’s likely fee award.” 181
Coffee has argued that this liquidation feature of the opt out right is
likely to discipline the class attorney because liquidation is “more direct,
immediate, and painful” than corporate exit rights. 182 But the liquidation
feature of the opt out right cannot provide that discipline because a class
attorney cannot avoid the consequences of the opt out by acting loyally.
This is because a class member who opts out of the class action can free
ride off of the “collective work” of the loyal class attorney, “as it usually
enters rather quickly into the public domain through court records and
insider leaks.” 183 Accordingly, the class member would still have an
incentive to opt out even if a class attorney was completely loyal to the
interests of the class. Indeed, Coffee acknowledges that class members
have significant reason to free ride off of the common benefit work of
others in the class. 184
In fact, the liquidation feature of opt-out rights causes harm because it
not only fails to discipline the class attorney against disloyal behavior,
but causes disloyal behavior. This is because the potential to opt out to
free ride off of prior investments induces class attorneys to accept
suboptimal settlements. Again, by opting out, a class member extricates
her claim from the others, and thus reduces the total claims on which the
class attorney can base her percentage fee. With a reduced potential fee,
the class attorney has less incentive to make investments in common
issues, which, in turn, reduces the probability that the class members will
prove those common issues and ultimately recover. 185 Given the reduced
181. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309.
182. Id.
183. See Rosenberg, supra note 164, at 425 (2000) (discussing mass tort litigation); id. at 393 n.1
(defining “mass torts” to include “contract, property, employment discrimination, antitrust,
securities and consumer fraud, and any other common law or statutory cause of action arising from
systematic business risk-taking and serving the social objectives of deterrence and compensation”).
184. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 336 (noting that, despite empirical evidence showing
that parties do become representative plaintiffs, “rational parties should be reluctant to serve as the
representative plaintiff” because they can “remain free riders and undertake no role that could give
rise” to the costs of litigation, including the potential for adverse fee-shifting).
185. David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority
of the Class Action, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 305, 320–21 (2014) (noting that both a free-rider and a
financing party with only a partial interest in the total recovery will not have “an incentive to spend
more in developing work product than would be optimal to maximize his or her” own individual
return); see also David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 829, 874–75 (2002) (noting that opt outs “diminish[] plaintiffs’
attorneys’ opportunities to exploit litigation scale economies, thereby diluting their investment
incentives to develop claim recovery values in the standard market process. . . . Minimizing rather
than maximizing exit opportunities and incentives from a settlement-only class action enables the
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expected recovery, the class attorney will have an incentive to accept a
lower settlement offer than would otherwise be accepted had there been
no opt outs. 186 Accordingly, opt-out rights make it more likely that the
class attorney will sell out the class members, not less.
The empirical evidence on opt outs supports the conclusion that opt
outs lead to suboptimal settlements due to free-riding. For example, John
Coffee notes in reviewing certain securities fraud class actions that
“large numbers departed the class, but only following the announcement
of the proposed class settlement,” which demonstrated that the opt outs
“were not seeking to gain timing or other tactical advantages, which they
would have needed to pursue at an earlier stage.” 187 Coffee concludes
from the timing of the opt outs that the class members who opted out
“were obviously dissatisfied with the proposed settlement,” but the
timing also strongly suggests that the opt outs planned on free-riding off
of the work of the class attorney. 188
Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that high-value claims are
more likely to opt out, which supports the inference that opt outs tend to
dramatically reduce the class attorney’s incentives to invest. 189 In some
instances, such as in litigation involving the diet reduction drug FenPhen, opt outs can completely unravel the settlement. 190 This reduction
in incentives is further supported by empirical evidence showing that

investing attorneys to capture greater return and commensurately increases value-creating
investment by reducing competition from free-riders.”).
186. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1116.
187. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 315–16.
188. Id. Coffee argues that opt out class members tend to do much better than non-opt-outs, in
some cases recovering more than the proposed settlement. Id. at 313. However, this result does not
undermine the conclusion that opt-out rights result in suboptimal settlements. In such situations the
class attorneys anticipate the opt outs and thus reduce their efforts accordingly, resulting in the very
suboptimal settlement that the opt outs want to abandon. Coffee himself admits this effect, noting
that “[l]ogically, one should assume that, when seventy percent of the claims opt out, this was not a
complete surprise to class counsel.” Id. at 318.
189. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 66, at 1555 (noting that “[a]s th[e] recovery increases, so
does the opt-out rate”); see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1082 n.111 (same, citing
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 66); Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 318 (noting that, because
of the fact that high value claims opt out of class actions, the class action becomes “the vehicle for
compensating the residual and less sophisticated plaintiffs”).
190. See NAGAREDA, supra note 13, at 143–47 (discussing unraveling of fen-phen settlement);
Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 318 (same, noting that “90,000 persons opt[ed] out”); Lahav,
supra note 13, at 622 (noting that opt-out rights can result in “adverse selection” which may unravel
the class); Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 355 (noting that “there could be sufficiently strong
opt-out incentives as to completely unravel the class action”).

06 - Campos .docx (Do Not Delete)

12/20/2016 12:47 PM

1498

[Vol. 91:1461

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

attorneys expend much less effort in separate actions as compared to
their efforts in class actions. 191
2.

Loyalty Through Fiduciary Duties

A trust model of the class action does more than show that providing
a right to opt out for each class member is self-defeating. It can also
provide guidance on how to ensure the loyalty of the class attorney. But,
before discussing this guidance, it is worth highlighting that, unlike for
trusts, fiduciary regulation of the manager is unlikely to be effective for
class actions.
As an initial matter, in both contexts the manager is regulated
primarily through fiduciary duties, or “the threat of after-the-fact liability
for failure to” act in “the best interests of the” beneficiaries. 192 The
source of the class attorney’s fiduciary duties is the Due Process Clause,
which the Supreme Court has interpreted to require that class action
procedures “fairly insure[] the protection of the interests of absent
parties,” and that the class representative “in fact adequately
represent[s]” the absent class members. 193 Although this duty of
adequate representation applies to the class representative, herself a class
member, Rule 23 takes into account the de facto trustee role of the class
attorney by separately requiring the attorney “to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class.” 194
The class attorney’s duty of “adequate representation” is simply a rearticulation of the trustee’s primary fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. 195 The trustee’s duty of loyalty protects against “conflicts of
interest” by “requiring a fiduciary to act in the ‘best’ or even ‘sole’
interests of the principal.” 196 Similarly, in the class action context, courts
have been especially vigilant in protecting class members from class
attorneys who enter “sweetheart” settlements that benefit the attorneys at
the class members’ expense. 197

191. Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 346 n.87 (discussing empirical evidence).
192. Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 201.
193. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940).
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
195. Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 201 (“The primary fiduciary duties are loyalty and care.”).
196. Id.
197. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1390–91 (discussing sweetheart settlements); Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 n.30 (1999) (rejecting a class action settlement because of
the concern that “[i]n a strictly rational world, plaintiffs’ counsel would always press for the limit of
what the defense would pay. But with an already enormous fee within counsel’s grasp, zeal for the
client may relax sooner than it would in a case brought on behalf of one claimant.”); Reynolds v.
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However, trust law and class action differ as to the viability of using
fiduciary duties to regulate the actions of the manager. In trust law,
“[t]he agency costs-checking mechanisms of the private trust depend on
the existence of relatively few residual claimants.” 198 This is because
“[t]he relatively smaller number of residual claimants and their relatively
larger stakes lessens the impact of the collective action and free-rider
dynamics.” 199 Consequently, the beneficiaries in a trust have sufficient
incentive to monitor and bring breach of fiduciary suits against the
trustee (at least in theory).
In contrast to the trust, the class action by definition contains
numerous class members. 200 In fact, and as noted above, the whole point
of the class action is to prevent the collective action and free-rider
problems that arise from the numerosity of the class members. 201
Accordingly, fiduciary regulation is unlikely to be successful in the class
action context precisely for the same reasons why a class action is
needed in the first place.
The difficulty of fiduciary regulation in the class action context
further makes it unlikely that creditors can serve as third party monitors
of the class attorney. Arguably the most important benefit of the trust is
asset partitioning, which prevents the trustee from using the res for her
own personal benefit, to the detriment of both the beneficiaries and third
party creditors. 202 Trust law enforces this partitioning through the
doctrine of “equitable tracing,” which allows a beneficiary to attach “an
equitable lien on property transferred by the trustee to a third-party in
breach of trust.” 203 Equitable tracing, in effect, deputizes third parties to

Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The principal issue presented by these
appeals is whether the district judge discharged the judicial duty to protect the members of a class in
class action litigation from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and
fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class. This problem,
repeatedly remarked by judges and scholars, . . . requires district judges to exercise the highest
degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.”).
198. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 680 (emphasis added). Of course, some trusts may have many
beneficiaries, which, as with the class action, would reduce the utility of fiduciary duties. I thank
Steve Urice for pointing this out to me.
199. Id. at 679.
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (defining the numerosity requirement).
201. See supra section I.B.2.
202. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 438; see also id. at 469 (calling this in rem feature
“the principal contribution of trust law”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 179, at
416 (“This insulation of assets held in trust from the personal creditors of the trustee is the essential
contribution of trust law.”).
203. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 672 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–95 (AM.
LAW INST. 1959)).
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monitor the trustee’s management of the res for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. It does so by penalizing a third party who contributes to a
trustee’s breach of her fiduciary duties. 204 However, this deputizing
effect of asset partitioning is unlikely to be effective in the class action
context because the class members are unlikely to file suit for breaches
of fiduciary duty. As a result, the class members are unlikely to use
remedies like equitable tracing to induce a creditor to monitor the class
attorney.
3.

Loyalty Through Incentives

Despite this difference in the efficacy of fiduciary regulation, a trust
model of the class action does suggest an additional method to ensure
that the class attorney remains loyal to the class members. Specifically, a
trust model of the class action provides guidance in developing a market
for control of the class action. Again, there exists no well-developed
market for control in either the trust or class action context. However,
the trust model illuminates certain features of the class action that
strongly suggest that a limited market for control would be both possible
and beneficial.
In the trust context, the settlor can appoint a “trust protector” who has
“one or more powers capable of affecting what the trustees are to do
with the trust property.” 205 A trust protector is typically chosen “by the
settlor to represent the settlor’s interests in making specified trust
decisions that the settlor will be unable to make,” and thus can serve
“[a]s the living embodiment of the dead settlor.” 206
In the class action context, the court similarly functions as a protector
because federal courts view themselves as a “fiduciary for absentee
claimants.” 207 “Fiduciary” is probably the wrong term because the class
204. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 647–48 (concluding that equitable tracing reflects “a
judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders to the trust deal between settlor and trustee in order
to vindicate the deal”); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 464 (explaining that under equitable
tracing, “the third party transferee is almost by definition a lower-cost monitor of the [trustee’s]
breach of duty than is the [beneficiary]”); Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 672–73 (quoting Langbein, and
concluding that “the rule of equitable tracing appears to reflect the parties’ presumed intent in light
of the comparative advantage of the outsider to bear the agency costs associated with this particular
potential breach by the trustee”).
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 cmts. b–d (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
206. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2761, 2763 (2006).
207. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127–
28 (2000) (“In the context of aggregation, judges have long claimed for themselves another role,
that of fiduciary for absentee claimants.”).
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attorney is clearly the fiduciary of the class members. Nevertheless,
courts have self-consciously considered themselves “protector[s] of class
interests” 208 and often exercise similar administrative duties like
removing the class attorney. 209 This protector function is typically
invoked when a class action settlement is proposed. 210 This is because all
class action settlements require approval from the court after a fairness
hearing. 211 During such hearings, judges assume a “judicial duty to
protect the members of a class in class action litigation from lawyers for
the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary
obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the
class.” 212
The class action can take advantage of the protector function of the
court by using it to create a market for control. Specifically, during the
fairness hearing for a class action settlement the court, as protector, can
invite bids for control of the class action. In bidding, a third party (such
as an insurer, a hedge fund, or a class member herself) would offer to
buy the claims outright and to have the discretion either to negotiate a
new settlement or litigate the claims directly. The proceeds could then be
used to compensate the class members, and the original class attorney
can receive a set percentage fee. The court, as protector, would oversee
the entire bid process and monitor the bidders to avoid collusion. In fact,
state courts have already experimented with permitting settlement
“objectors” to make bids to purchase the claims outright for an amount
greater than the settlement. 213
Creating such a market for control through an auction procedure has
been proposed before. 214 The trust model is useful because it illuminates
208. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing
this protector role in the context of “its role of assuring reasonableness in the awarding of fees in
equitable fund cases”).
209. See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that class
counsel “was unfit to represent the class” and ordering his removal as class counsel).
210. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district judge
in the settlement phase of a class action suit [is] a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to
the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (discussing fairness hearings).
212. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279; see also 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 13.40 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing the fiduciary duty of the court in reviewing a class
action settlement during a fairness hearing).
213. See, e.g., Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., No. 1091-VCL, 2012 WL 1655538, at *2 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 2012) (approving a class action settlement as fair “unless the objectors make the
equivalent of a topping bid”).
214. For a recent and much more comprehensive proposal to auction control at the settlement
fairness hearing, see Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 227
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the role of the court as a protector in making the market and ultimately
conducting the sale. This is an advantage that is absent in the market for
corporate control. In that market, the corporate managers can obstruct
takeovers through a variety of methods. 215 In contrast, the court, as
protector, decides to whom (and whether) to sell the claims, and in doing
so can prevent the original class attorney from entrenching herself.
A trust model is further useful because it suggests a way to create a
market for control without providing control rights to the class members,
which again, they cannot exercise optimally. 216 Thus, the trust model
allows the class action to take advantage of the best of both the trust and
corporate worlds. The class action can still retain managerial control
over the claims with the class attorney while enabling the court, as
protector, to facilitate a market for control. In this way, the class attorney
can provide the scale advantages of common ownership while the class
members would retain the advantages of the market for control.
Indeed, unlike providing opt-out rights, which would result in
suboptimal investment and free-riding, selling the claims in toto would
have the advantage of “replacing a party whose interest is only in the
profits flowing from the award of fees . . . with a party with a bona fide
interest in maximizing the net return to the claim for a party.” 217
Moreover, the use of a protector and a common manager to sell control
in the class action context avoids the problems of free-riding that can
occur in the corporate context when tender offers for control are made
for a company with a large number of dispersed shareholders. 218 It does

(2014). Macey and Miller have proposed an auction of the class members’ claims upon the filing of
the class action, which would have the advantage of disbursing funds immediately to the class
members. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 105–08 (holding the auction during the fairness hearing
has one advantage over auctioning the case at filing). But auctioning off control at the settlement
fairness hearing reduces the information costs of the court because the proposed settlement would
set the minimum bid, while a court holding an auction at filing would, in some cases, have to “state
a minimum bid in order to prevent an excessively low sale price.” Id. at 107.
215. Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621,
33–35 (2003) (discussing and criticizing theory that management should threaten obstruction in bids
because “management knows better”); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1982) (discussing and criticizing such obstruction).
216. This is one difference between my proposal and the comprehensive proposal for class
settlement auctions provided by Jay Tidmarsh. Tidmarsh allows for opt-out rights, while I do not
because of the harm they cause to class attorney loyalty. See Tidmarsh, supra note 214, at 264–65
(discussing the timing of opt outs).
217. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 110; see also Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 637 (making the
same point in discussing trusts).
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so by initially vesting collective control in the class attorney to invest
and develop the claims, and then selling the claims in the aggregate with
the settlement amount as the minimum bid.
Designing such a market for control at the settlement stage would
require important design considerations to avoid the problems generally
associated with auctions, such as collusive bidding. 219 However, the
existence of the court as protector strongly suggests that these problems
are not fatal, and thus “do not refute the desirability of experimenting
with an auction approach.” 220
One concern worth addressing is the risk that such a market for
control would reduce the incentive of a class attorney to develop the
claims in the first place “by threatening to deprive [her] of any benefit
from [her] research into the case.” 221 This is also a significant concern
for tender offers in the corporate law context. 222 However, the concern
with reducing incentives to bring class actions is unlikely to surface in
the market proposed here, because, in the settlement context, the class
attorney would receive the same percentage fee she would have received
from the settlement itself. Accordingly, the class attorney would be
compensated for initial work and would maintain the same incentives to
invest in common issues she would have had in the absence of such an
auction procedure.
4.

Due Process

The concern with protecting litigant autonomy, however, is ultimately
not based on the utility of procedures like the opt out to police class
attorneys. Instead, it is based on a more fundamental belief that as a
218. See Bebchuk, supra note 130, at 958 (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42
(1980)) (“The free-rider problem may prevent a takeover from taking place even if it would be
efficient.”); Grossman & Hart, supra.
219. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 111.
220. Id. at 110 (concluding that the difficulties associated with an auction approach “are not
insurmountable and do not refute the desirability of experimenting with an auction approach”).
221. See id. at 114 (noting that “[a]n auction approach could deter first movers by threatening to
deprive them of any benefit from their research into the case”); John C. Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 692 (1986) (arguing that in an auction
procedure “[t]he entrepreneurially motivated attorney who suspects that a legal violation has
occurred would have a reduced incentive to investigate further because, even if a violation is
discovered, the attorney would still have to outbid others in order to profit from this effort”).
222. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing that auctions chill first bidders and acquisitions more
generally).

06 - Campos .docx (Do Not Delete)

12/20/2016 12:47 PM

1504

[Vol. 91:1461

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

normative matter, class members should have control over their claims.
Coffee himself is quite explicit about this when he states that his
“normative position” is “to facilitate client autonomy” rather than “the
‘best interests’ of the class (however determined).” 223
The Supreme Court has also suggested that the opt out right is
valuable in itself as a matter of due process. This due process concern
with opt-out rights arose prominently in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 224
where the Court vacated a global class action settlement of asbestos
claims because, among other things, the class action was certified under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which affords the class members no notice or
opportunity to opt out. 225 The Court concluded that the lack of opt-out
rights was unfair because “objectors to the collectivism of a mandatory
subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to abstain.” 226
Indeed, the Ortiz Court suggested, without holding, that the failure of
the class action to provide notice and opt-out rights to the class members
raised serious due process concerns. 227 The Court noted in particular that
without notice and a right to opt out, “[t]he legal rights of absent class
members . . . are resolved regardless of either their consent, or, in a class
with objectors, their express wish to the contrary.” 228 Recently, the Court
has strongly suggested that opt-out rights are required as a matter of due
process in a variety of contexts, from class action decisions
themselves 229 to decisions involving the Erie doctrine 230 and
arbitration. 231

223. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 380.
224. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
225. Id. at 844–45; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that for class actions certified
under (b)(1) and (b)(2), the court “may direct appropriate notice to the class” but is not required to
do so).
226. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846–47 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 846–48.
228. Id. at 847–48.
229. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (questioning whether procedural
due process permits a mandatory class action for claims seeking injunctive relief, noting as an aside
that such class actions are permitted under Rule 23(b)(2), “rightly or wrongly”).
230. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443
(2010) (upholding Rule 23 class actions against Erie and Rules Enabling Act challenges so long as
the class actions involve “willing” plaintiffs).
231. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (citing
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985)) (affirming the validity of class
action waivers in arbitration agreements and noting that “[f]or a class-action money judgment to
bind absentees in litigation . . . absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and a right to opt out of the class”).
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But the taking away of control should not violate due process because
it is necessary to ensure that the plaintiffs’ claims are, in fact, properly
developed. In other words, due process does not require the protection of
procedural rights like litigant autonomy when those procedural rights
would actually harm the plaintiffs’ entitlements rather than protect them.
I have addressed the due process issues surrounding litigant autonomy
and the opt-out right in great detail in a previous article.232 Here I want
to briefly note that trust law is not only instructive, but has been
instructive. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 233 the
Court reviewed a New York state law which permitted small trusts to
invest in “common fund trusts” for common administration. 234 Under
New York law, such common fund trusts were subject to periodic
“accountings” which settled “all questions respecting the management of
the common fund.” 235 Although the decrees permitted any claim against
the administrator of the common-fund trust, those with a potential claim
only received newspaper notice of the proceedings. 236
Among other things, the Court concluded that newspaper notice was
sufficient for individuals who could not be located or identified. This is
because “[t]he expense of keeping” those with such interests “informed
from day to day of substitutions . . . would impose a severe burden on
the plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages.” 237 Accordingly, the
Court had “no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are
not required in the name of due process.” 238
In essence, the Mullane Court concluded that due process does not
require procedural rights like individualized notice when such rights
would destroy the substantive rights that they were meant to protect. In
other words, Mullane, a trust case, stands for the proposition that
procedural rights are not required as a matter of due process when they
are self-defeating. Consequently, rights like an opportunity to opt out are
not required as a matter of due process in class actions because they
would be similarly self-defeating for class members.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24.
339 U.S. 306 (1950)
Id. at 307–09.
Id. at 311.
See id. at 309–10.
Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
Id.
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B.

Conflicts

1.

Class Cohesion

Along with opt-out rights, the Supreme Court has also insisted on the
class members being “cohesive” to ensure that “the use of the class
action device” is not “unfair.” 239 The Court first expressed its concern
with class cohesion in Amchem Products v. Windsor, 240 which involved
a global settlement of “current and future asbestos-related claims”
brought against a consortium of former asbestos manufacturers. 241
Among other things, the settlement “devis[ed] an administrative scheme
for [the] disposition of asbestos claims not yet in litigation.” 242 Thus, the
settlement not only covered those with present asbestos-related injuries,
but those who had been exposed to asbestos but had yet to manifest any
injury. 243 The settlement was included with a motion to certify the class,
and the district court approved both. 244 The Third Circuit, however,
vacated the class certification. 245
The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit. The Court
concluded that the class certification was improper because, among other
things, the plaintiffs failed to show that “the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members,” as required under Rule 23(b)(3). 246
According to the Court, the “predominance inquiry tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.” 247 The Court found no predominance of common issues
because the purported class members differed significantly as to a
number of issues of law and fact, such as the products they were exposed

239. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97
(2013) (noting that “the focus of the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a
proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,’” (citing Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __ U.S. __, 133 S.
Ct. 1426, 1436 (2012) (same).
240. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
241. Id. at 599–601.
242. Id. at 601.
243. Id. at 602–05 (describing the settlement).
244. Id. at 606.
245. Id. at 608.
246. Id. at 622; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth the predominance requirement).
247. Id. at 623 (citations omitted & emphasis added).
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to, the timing of each exposure, and the diseases or other injuries each
class member suffered. 248
Along with failing to satisfy predominance, the proposed class action
also failed to satisfy the “adequacy of representation” requirement under
Rule 23(a)(4). 249 The Court emphasized, in particular, that “for the
currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That
goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.” 250 Scholars have also
expressed a similar concern with those conflicts “that give rise to a
significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class
to skew in some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in
favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of
the relevant claims.” 251
As with opt-out rights, the trust model of the class action shows that
the class cohesion requirement is both unnecessary and harmful. As
noted above, both the class action and the trust are used in situations
where the recipients lack either the ability or the motivation to dispose of
the managed property at the appropriate scale. 252 One primary cause for
this inability to invest at the right scale is the existence of conflicting
interests among the recipients. For example, income beneficiaries and
principal beneficiaries can, and often do, conflict over investments that
may increase the res as a whole but may decrease either the income or
the principal. 253 The conflict between the principal beneficiary and the
income beneficiary—“the tension between capital appreciation and
income production”—is not materially different from the conflict
between the futures and presents in Amchem. 254 Thus, unlike other forms
of organizational law, “trust law facilitates the creation of residual
claimants with interests adverse to each other” 255 because it seeks to
alleviate the suboptimal investment and management that arises from
those conflicts.
248. Id. at 624 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996))
(“Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of
time, in different ways, and over different periods.”).
249. Id. at 625.
250. Id. at 626.
251. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 4, at 1684 (discussing Amchem, 521 U.S. 591); see also
ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.07 reporters’ notes cmt. d, at 158 (highlighting “commentary
conceptualizing adequate representation in class actions in terms of structural conflicts of interest”).
252. See supra section I.B.2.
253. See supra section I.B.2.
254. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 653.
255. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the insistence on class cohesion is harmful because it
prevents the use of the class action in many settings where the class
action is necessary to solve a problem of scale. For example, in mass tort
litigation like the asbestos litigation at the heart of Amchem, conflicts
among the class members are pervasive because of the heterogeneity of
the injuries the class members suffer. 256 As a result, in the aftermath of
Amchem and its insistence on class cohesion, “the class action has fallen
in disfavor as a means for resolving mass-tort claims.” 257
But the trust model of the class action shows that these conflicts
suggest just the opposite—that the class action should be especially
favored in mass tort litigation. First, the Amchem Court fails to consider
the far worse alternatives to using the class action in mass tort
litigation. 258 The alternative to a class action in cases like Amchem
would be separate lawsuits, which would allow the present plaintiffs to
exhaust all of the recoverable proceeds from the defendants before the
future plaintiffs even have a chance to file suit. 259 The Amchem Court
hinted at this possibility. It noted that while the case did not involve a
“limited fund,” “the terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation
decisions designed to confine compensation and limit defendants’
liability.” 260 Consequently, the Amchem Court expressed a real concern
that the present plaintiffs would exhaust compensation to the detriment
of the future plaintiffs. Moreover, the Amchem Court failed to note that,
unlike the present plaintiffs, the class attorney would be motivated to
enlarge the amount of recovery as a whole because her fee was based on
the total net settlement amount.261 Thus, the class attorney would act for
the benefit of all the class members equally, not just the present
plaintiffs.
More importantly, the class action is particularly necessary in mass
tort litigation because mass tort plaintiffs suffer the same problem of

256. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 385–86 (noting while discussing mass tort
litigation that the conflicts are pervasive because “[w]henever the injuries suffered by class
members are relatively heterogeneous, internal conflicts necessarily arise.”); Coffee, Governance,
supra note 7, at 318 (noting that “in mass tort cases, the variation in claim value can be particularly
great, based on the highly variable physical injuries suffered by the plaintiffs”).
257. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 25.
258. This is ironic because Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to determine whether “a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
259. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1115.
260. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
261. The Court noted that the class attorneys would “receive attorneys’ fees in an amount to be
approved by the District Court,” but did not specify how the fees would be calculated. Id. at 605.
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scale that plagues small claims litigation, but with far worse
consequences. 262 Like the small claims plaintiffs, mass tort plaintiffs are
numerous and share common issues of liability that would benefit from
the cost sharing and economies of scale provided by the class action. 263
Admittedly, unlike small claims plaintiffs, and as exemplified by
Amchem, mass tort plaintiffs vary significantly as to their individual net
expected recoveries. Thus, some mass torts plaintiffs may have an
individual incentive to bring suit, resulting in some investment in
common issues. 264 However, this high variance makes it more likely that
the plaintiffs will resist aggregate treatment. This is because plaintiffs
with high value claims have an incentive to avoid aggregation in order to
free ride, thus causing plaintiffs with low value claims to have a much
lower expected recovery or to not file at all. 265
Second, the absence of a class action in the mass tort context leads to
far worse results. As with small claims litigation, the result of the mass
torts plaintiffs’ resistance to aggregation is that the defendant will not
have liability optimally imposed on them, leading them to take less care.
In other words, like the small claims plaintiffs, the mass torts plaintiffs’
resistance to aggregation leads to the very mass torts they suffered. 266
However, mass torts plaintiffs suffer a much greater cost for this loss
in deterrence than small claims plaintiffs. For plaintiffs in small claims
262. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1081–85 (arguing that small claims plaintiffs and
mass tort plaintiffs both suffer from the problem of asymmetric stakes).
263. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993) (noting that “the
commonality of issues and actors among individual mass tort claims” distinguishes mass torts from
“automobile accident” and other “high volume” litigation).
264. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1081–85. But see Rosenberg & Spier, supra note
26, at 344 (“Even if fixed-cost barriers were removed, virtually any claim that turned on variable
cost investments—that is, all claims that present some litigable common question—would
nonetheless stand a good chance of being rendered worthless.”).
265. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1082 (noting that in mass tort litigation, “there may
be plaintiffs who are better off suing separately than joining the collective”); Coffee, Governance,
supra note 7, at 318 (noting that due to opt outs, “the class action in the mass tort context became
the repository for two categories of plaintiffs: (a) those whose claims either had evidentiary, factual,
or legal problems that made it undesirable to proceed individually; and (b) future claimants who had
not yet sustained injury”).
266. There is a paucity of empirical evidence of the effect of procedures like the class action on
the deterrence of mass torts. However, the available evidence does show “persuasively . . . that tort
law achieves something significant in encouraging safety,” albeit imperfectly. Gary T. Schwartz,
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV.
377, 423 (1994) (discussing different sectors of tort liability). This evidence of the imperfect
deterrence function of tort law is supportive of the view that one source of the imperfection is the
restriction on the use of class actions. However, admittedly, more work must be done to study this
effect and to rule out alternatives.
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consumer or products cases, the nonpecuniary losses are either
nonexistent (e.g., the only loss is an easily replaceable washer), or very
small (e.g., the smell of the washer). In contrast, mass tort plaintiffs
typically suffer from such nonpecuniary injuries as cancer or death,
which no amount of damages can ever replace.267 Thus, the costs of
failing to certify class actions in mass torts litigation make mass tort
plaintiffs especially vulnerable.
Finally, it is worth noting that an increase in mass torts from a failure
to aggregate is more likely than in small claims litigation. Unlike in
small claims cases, where the plaintiffs are typically consumers of the
defendants’ products, the plaintiffs in mass tort cases rarely have an
opportunity, apart from insurance subrogation, to aggregate ex ante. 268 In
addition, in many mass tort situations there are not sufficient alternative
regulatory schemes to prevent the tort. 269
2.

Issue Class Actions

The trust model of the class action shows that the class cohesion
requirement is harmful because it prevents the use of the class action in
situations like mass tort litigation where, due to conflicts, the problem of
scale is especially acute. But the trust model also provides guidance in
resolving the problem of scale caused by class member conflicts.
As noted earlier, trust law permits conflicts among the beneficiaries,
such as trusts where one beneficiary has an interest in the principal of
the res while another has an interest in the income produced by the
res. 270 To deal with such situations, recent developments in trust law
permit a trustee to focus on the total return on the res 271 while granting
the trustee the power to “adjust between principal and income to the
extent the trustee considers necessary.” 272 Permitting such powers of
267. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1085.
268. See David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in
Tort Claims (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
269. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1077 n.78 (noting insufficiency of alternatives);
Rosenberg, supra note 185, at 896–97 (arguing in favor of mandatory class actions for mass torts
because “[r]egulatory and market alternatives that collectivize mass tort cases on a less
comprehensive and less compulsory basis fail to take full advantage of scale economies and
possibilities for redistributing claim-generated wealth”).
270. See supra section I.B.2.
271. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 2(b) (1994) (“A trustee’s investment and management
decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the
trust portfolio as a whole.”); id. cmt. (“In the trust setting the term ‘portfolio’ embraces the entire
trust estate.”).
272. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104(a) (1997).
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equitable adjustment are designed to “authorize[] the trustee to make
adjustments between principal and income that may be necessary if the
income component of a portfolio’s total return is too small or too large
because of investment decisions made by the trustee.” 273 Thus trust law
allows a trustee to maximize the total res, and then equitably distribute
the proceeds afterwards to satisfy each beneficiary’s partial share.
The class action can also separate total return investing in the claims
from equitable distribution of the proceeds by utilizing issue class
actions. Rule 23 allows for class actions “with respect to particular
issues,” but only “[w]hen appropriate.” 274 Despite this provision, some
courts, most notably the Fifth Circuit, initially expressed disapproval of
issue class actions because such class actions would “eviscerate the
predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be
automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, a
result that could not have been intended.” 275
However, issue class actions have recently gained support from both
courts and scholars. For example, the ALI’s Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation has endorsed the use of issue class actions so long
as such a class action “materially advances the disposition of the
litigation as a whole,” 276 and some courts have acknowledged that “it [is]
more efficient” for such common issues “to be resolved in a single
proceeding than for [each issue] to be litigated separately in hundreds of
different trials.” 277 Moreover, some state courts have also permitted

273. Id. § 104 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(requiring trustee to “make an equitable adjustment” if necessary to comply with duty of
impartiality as to principal and income beneficiaries).
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). Alternatively, a court could certify a class action, but later decertify
the class after all common issues are adjudicated. State courts, following federal practice, have
experimented with this “decertification” procedure, which, in effect, creates an ex post issue class
action. See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1269 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that such
decertification was not an abuse of discretion, citing federal cases).
275. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996); see also ALI,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.02 reporters’ notes cmt. a at 94 (noting that “[c]ourts are divided
over the precise relationship between the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and the
authorization for issue classes in Rule 23(c)(4)”).
276. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.24, at 273 (2004);
see also McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled on other
grounds sub nom, Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (concluding that an
issue class action was not appropriate because it would not “materially advance the litigation”);
ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.02(a)(1) (recommending that a court “should exercise
discretion to authorize aggregate treatment of a common issue by way of a class action if the court
determines that resolution of the common issue would materially advance the resolution of multiple
[] claims by addressing the core of the dispute . . . .”).
277. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013).
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issue class actions as “[t]he pragmatic solution” in some situations,
citing federal case law on Rule 23 issue class actions. 278 In fact, the Fifth
Circuit has since relaxed its position on issue class actions. 279
Indeed, issue class actions have the added benefit of preventing the
class attorney from influencing the distribution of damages. As noted
earlier, the trustee has discretion to re-characterize the total return of the
res to allow for an equitable distribution of proceeds to beneficiaries
with conflicting interests.280 In addition, trust law imposes a duty on the
trustee to treat the beneficiaries impartially. 281 This duty is a corollary to
the facilitation of conflicts in trusts, and thus, like conflicts, the duty is
“a salient distinguishing characteristic of trust law as organizational
law.” 282 In fact, the duty of impartiality makes trust law a particularly apt
analogy to class actions because a class attorney’s duty to adequately
represent the class also includes a duty to treat the class members
impartially. 283
But enforcing such a duty of impartiality in the class action context
(and, arguably, in many trust contexts) is difficult because the class
278. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269–70 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying a class action trial on common issues of liability).
279. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 628–29 (5th Cir. 1999)
(permitting an issue class action, distinguishing Castano, 84 F.3d 734, because Castano presented a
risk that a second jury would re-examine a previously decided common issue in violation of the
Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause); Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1270 (noting that the Fifth
Circuit has relaxed its position on issue class actions, citing Mullen, 186 F.3d 620). Avoiding such
Seventh Amendment issues would be relatively easy to accomplish, and thus would not pose any
problem to the certification of the issue class actions discussed here. In essence, common issues of
liability arise from the defendant’s ex ante behavior, while individual issues arise from the effect of
that behavior on the plaintiffs ex post. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Class
Actions, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855 (2015). Accordingly, common issues of fact can easily be separated
from individual issues of fact because the issues arise from two different points in time. See
Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1073.
280. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104 cmt. (1997) (noting that “the purpose of the
power to adjust in Section 104(a) is to eliminate the need for a trustee who operates under the
prudent investor rule to be concerned about the income component of the portfolio’s total return”).
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“When there are two or
more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.”).
282. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business
Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 329–30 (2003)
(noting that, unlike in other organizational forms, “trust law imposes a duty of impartiality”).
283. See Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting in a bankruptcy case
that in “the usual class action” the class representative has a “fiduciary duty as class
representative . . . to represent all members of the class equally”). Cf. Lahav, supra note 13, at 594
(noting that “[i]n the absence of other, competing goals (such as decentralized adjudicators or the
right to a jury trial), it is a general principle of law that similar cases ought to reach similar
outcomes,” although “[d]octrinally, the principle requiring equality of outcomes is weakly
supported”).
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attorney is indifferent to the distribution of any recovery. Again, the
class attorney solves the problem of scale among the class members by
having a fee that is tied to the aggregate recovery of the claims as a
whole. 284 Accordingly, the class attorney has an incentive to exploit
economies of scale in investing in common issues. 285 However, no such
economies arise in issues that are unique to each individual class
member because the issues lack any spillover benefits for other class
members. 286 Thus, the class attorney does not care how that recovery is
later parceled out to each class member, or even if it goes to the class
members at all. 287
Consequently, the use of issue class actions has the benefit of
ensuring impartiality because it would prevent distributional issues from
being influenced by the indifference of the class attorney. Because an
issue class action allows the class attorney to focus solely on the “total
return” of the claims, which is the only thing she is incentivized to care
about, distribution is safely kept away from the attorney. Moreover, the
issue class action allows the class members to retain some control over
their claims while avoiding the problems of scale that arise when
common issues are present. 288 Indeed, issue class actions would avoid
the inaccuracies that would arise from recharacterizing proceeds. This is
because “damages recovery [can] proceed[] strictly in accordance with
accepted evidentiary standards” and thus limit recovery only to “specific
losses suffered by class members.” 289

284. See supra section I.B.3.
285. See supra section I.B.3.
286. Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 314 (noting that issues that are not common to the
class lack “spillovers” and thus “plaintiffs cannot benefit from centralized investment decisions”).
287. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that
“awarding attorneys’ fees based on the entire settlement amount rather than individual distributions
creates a potential conflict of interest between absent class members and their counsel” because the
class attorney is indifferent to how the amount is distributed while “[c]lass members are not
indifferent to whether funds are distributed to them or to cy pres recipients”); Int’l Precious Metals
Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (denying cert. and criticizing class
action settlement that awarded the class attorneys a percentage of the total settlement amount, but
reverted some of the amount back to the defendant, noting that “[a]rrangements such as
[these] . . . decouple class counsel’s financial incentives from those of the class”); Tidmarsh, supra
note 22, at 1193 (noting that “a self-interested class counsel . . . is ultimately indifferent to the
distribution of the remedy”).
288. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1111 (“[A] plaintiff may still have her ‘day in
court’ in the context of a bifurcated class action with a common-issue proceeding and individualissue determinations.”).
289. 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:17, at 517 (4th ed.
2002). For an example of litigation with a common issue class action coupled with each class
member bringing separate claims to prove individual issues, see Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.
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Although issue class actions allow a class attorney to avoid
distributional issues, and thus remain impartial to the class members,
such class actions may undermine impartiality in two circumstances.
First, in situations where there is a limited (or near limited) fund like in
Amchem, it may make sense for the Court to introduce a distribution
procedure that prevents the exhaustion of the fund. 290 Second, in
situations where proving individual damages is costly, it may make
sense to use a procedure of distribution that relaxes evidentiary
requirements to allow more class members to recover.291
Again, trust law, which also must contend with “the problem of
balancing the interests of residual claimants of different classes,” 292 is
instructive. As noted earlier, in dealing with income and principal
beneficiaries, recent developments in trust law permit the trustee to
make equitable adjustments, including the power to reclassify proceeds
(e.g., classifying “income” as “principal”) to fairly distribute the
proceeds. 293 Trust law also permits the use of the “unitrust,” which
“abolishes the distinction between income and principal” by directing
“[t]he unitrust trustee [to] pay[] out not traditional income, which is
determined formalistically, but a fixed percentage of the portfolio, which
is measured periodically.” 294 Like equitable adjustment, the unitrust
improves fairness among the principal and income beneficiaries. 295 But
the unitrust further reduces the costs of distribution considerably by
defining a mechanical formula for distributing the proceeds. 296
2d 1246, 1256–58 (Fla. 2006) (describing a “three phase[]” trial plan with a common issue class
action phase and a phase having “new juries . . . decid[ing] the individual liability and compensatory
damages claims for each class member . . . .”).
290. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 626 (1997); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 n.30 (1999).
291. Cf. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring the ascertainability
of the class members because otherwise “individualized fact-finding or mini-trials will be required
to prove class membership”).
292. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652.
293. See supra section II.B.2.
294. Joel C. Dobris, Why Five? The Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing Affect of the Five
Percent Unitrust and Spending Rate on Settlors, Their Advisors, and Retirees, 40 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 39, 42 (2005) (citing James P. Garland, The Problems With Unitrusts, 1 J. PRIV.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 35 (1999)).
295. Id. at 47 (“Two statutory solutions currently apply when traditional allocation rules fail. One
solution is to give the trustee the power to reallocate or adjust receipts. The other is the unitrust.”).
296. It should be noted that while a unitrust is typically the choice of the settlor, some states
permit a trust lacking such terms to operate as a unitrust. See, e.g., 12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3527(b)(1) (West 2016) (providing for conversion of a trust to a unitrust).
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In general, courts have been resistant to the type of recharacterization
of shares in the managed property permitted by trust law. 297 Such “fluid
recovery” procedures raise the risk that uninjured persons will collect at
the expense of those injured, or that some class members may receive a
windfall. 298 However, most of this resistance has arisen in appellate
courts that have focused on preserving individual autonomy over the
claim. 299 District courts, on the other hand, which must address
distributional issues head on, have been open to the recharacterization of
claims for fairness and efficiency purposes. 300 For example, courts have
historically used bifurcation procedures in antitrust and securities fraud
class actions, often assessing a “lump sum” award at the end of the first
(liability) phase 301 and then using “mechanical formulae” to distribute
damages at the second (damages) phase. 302 Such a bifurcated,
mechanical procedure mirrors the fairness and efficiency advantages of
the unitrust.
297. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled on other
grounds sub nom, Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (“‘[F]luid recovery’
has been forbidden in this circuit.”).
298. See 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 289, § 10:20, at 527 (discussing criticism against fluid
recovery that “it would result in a windfall to nonmembers of the class”); Campos, Proof, supra
note 24, at 788–96 (discussing this concern). It is worth noting that the term “fluid recovery” is
sometimes used to refer to “the entire procedure of classwide calculation of damages and
distribution of the aggregate amount of any unclaimed balance thereof to injured class members or
to others under cy pres notions or other doctrines.” Id. § 10:17, at 517 n.7. However, “fluid
recovery” procedures typically refer more narrowly to procedures in which “a court awards
compensation to a group that approximates the original group that suffered harm. For example, if a
taxicab operator overcharges its customers, a fluid recovery might involve a court ordering the
operator to offer discounts to its customers in the future.” Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer & Caitlin
V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 877
(2014) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
299. See supra section II.A.4 (discussing due process objections to class actions with no opt-out
rights).
300. See Lahav, supra note 13, at 575 (noting that concerns with preserving autonomy over a
claim “dominates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, an equality principle is emerging at the
district court level,” with district courts “using informal procedures to facilitate settlements of mass
tort cases” (emphasis in original)).
301. See 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 18:54 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing the use of such bifurcation procedures in antitrust class actions, in which “a lump sum
damage award” is assessed against the defendant after liability is established); 7 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:72 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that such
procedures are used in securities class actions).
302. 6 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 301, § 18:53 (“Class proof of damages, either by an aggregate
lump sum award to the class as a whole or by application of mechanical formulae or statistical
methods to individual class members’ claims, has received approval in several antitrust
cases . . . .”); 7 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 301, § 22:65 (“Determination of damages sustained by
individual class members in securities class action suits is often a mechanical task involving the
administration of a formula . . . .”).
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Bifurcation and mechanical distribution procedures can be used to
deal with the special concerns with fairness raised in Amchem. In
Amchem, the Court expressed a concern that those presently injured
would induce the class attorney to bias any class action settlement in
their favor over the interests of the futures. 303 Accordingly, an issue class
action would allow class members with “present” claims to directly bias
any proceeds in their favor, at the expense of class members who have
“future” claims that have not yet accrued.
A court can avoid such biasing by relying upon objective methods of
determining the damages for each class member. For example, a court
can base damages on a schedule that closely resembles the schedules
used to pay benefits in Medicare or in workers’ compensation
schemes. 304 The use of such damage scheduling would allow for the
distribution of proceeds free from the influence of any party. Moreover,
the schedule can be adjusted by the court to avoid the exhaustion of
funds by earlier claimants.
Finally, unlike in the trust context, class actions can take advantage of
the “numerosity” of the class members by using random sampling to
determine claim values for class members. 305 Random sampling can
provide “outcome equality” because “[s]ampling and similar innovative
procedures . . . extrapolat[e] results of sample trials to the rest of the
plaintiff population,” free of any of the selection biases produced by a
nonrandom sample. 306 Moreover, sampling reduces costs by limiting the
number of claims actually litigated. Such sampling can be, and has been,
deployed in a bifurcation procedure. 307 Although the Supreme Court has
recently disapproved of such “Trial by Formula” procedures in class
actions, 308 the trust model suggests that they should be encouraged, not
discouraged, by courts.
303. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (noting the present’s preference
for “generous immediate payments” as compared to the future’s preference for “an ample, inflationprotected fund for the future”).
304. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1105–06 (discussing this possibility); David
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Litigation: Lessons from a Special Master,
69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 695 (1989) (noting and praising use of damage scheduling in mass tort cases,
“similar to those created by statute for workers’ compensation programs”).
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring, for class certification purposes, that “the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . . . .”).
306. Lahav, supra note 13, at 578; see also D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights
Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 563 (2008) (noting that “[r]andom assignment assures that, in the
absence of bad luck, units who receive one treatment are not systematically different from those
who receive the other treatment.”).
307. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–87 (9th Cir. 1996).
308. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 341 (2011).
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III. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
The previous Part used a trust model of the class action to criticize the
insistence under current law on opt-out rights and class cohesion in class
actions involving damage claims. This Part extends the model to address
other controversial issues in class action law.
A.

Ascertainability

Recently, some federal courts have required the ascertainability of
class members in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3). 309 In
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 310 for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a
consumer class action that asserted claims that the defendant
fraudulently marketed diet pills. 311 However, the named representatives
could not ascertain the identity of every class member because the class
members did not purchase the pills directly from the defendant, and class
members were “unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase,” such
as receipts. 312
The Third Circuit vacated the class action, concluding that the
ascertainability of each class member was required because, among
other things, “it eliminates serious administrative burdens that are
incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action by insisting
on easy identification of class members.” 313 Moreover, requiring
ascertainability would protect the rights of both the plaintiffs and the
defendants. 314 Although the Third Circuit has softened its stance on
ascertainability somewhat, 315 the Supreme Court has recently decided
two class action cases which raised, without deciding, similar issues of
ascertainability, focusing on situations where the class may “contain[]
309. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that “[a]scertainability
mandates a rigorous approach at the outset because of the key roles it plays as part of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action lawsuit”). But see Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th
Cir. 2015) (declining to follow Bayer and impose such a “heightened ascertainability requirement”).
310. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
311. Id. at 303–04.
312. Id. at 304.
313. Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
314. Id.
315. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that the
ascertainability requirement “does not mean that a plaintiff must be able to identify all class
members at class certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show that ‘class members can be
identified’” (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 n.2)). Indeed, the Third Circuit’s decision in Byrd
brings the court’s ascertainability requirement closer to the ex post ascertainability requirement
proposed here.
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hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to
any damages.” 316
The trust model of the class action demonstrates that such an
ascertainability requirement is harmful. The trust model of the class
action shows that the class action and the trust are commonly used when
the recipients cannot invest in the managed property at the right scale. In
the class action context, this problem of scale is caused in large part by
the fact that the class members must incur significant transaction costs in
acting collectively to exploit economies of scale. One such transaction
cost is the search costs associated with identifying who the other class
members are, as is especially true in small claims litigation. Thus,
requiring the ascertainability of the class members at the outset would
foreclose the use of the class action in many appropriate settings.
Here trust law is particularly instructive. Trust law also requires “a
beneficiary who is definitely ascertainable,” but “[i]t is not
necessary . . . that the beneficiary should be known at the time of the
creation of the trust.” 317 Instead, the beneficiary only needs to be
“ascertainable within the period of the rule against perpetuities.” 318 One
reason is that the settlor may want to protect future interests who,
because of their lack of existence, cannot possibly dispose of the res for
their own benefit. Nevertheless, trust law does require some ex post
ascertainability so that the beneficiary does receive the benefits of trust

316. See John Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2015, 10:32 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/relist-watch-65/ [https://perma.cc/2ZJM-85QK] (explaining
that Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), granted certiorari on
issue of “[w]hether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective
action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds
of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages”); John Elwood, Relist
Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (May 1, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/relist-watch61/ [https://perma.cc/CJ9C-Q9YJ ] (explaining that Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct.
1892 (2015), granted certiorari on issue of “[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing
upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a
federal statute”).
The Supreme Court recently decided both decisions without discussing the ascertainability
requirement. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2015); Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, ___U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2015). However, in Tyson, the Court did suggest that the
members need not be ascertained prior to distribution of any award recovered at trial, which would
be consistent with the proposal here. See Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1050 (affirming certification of class
action but remanding on issue of whether there exists a method to identify injured class members).
317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
318. Id. § 112; see also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 464 (“Subject to the rule against
perpetuities, the common law permits the beneficial interest in a trust to shift among individuals
over time, and these shifts may be conditional upon a wide variety of contingencies.”).
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management. 319 Accordingly, such a relaxed ex post ascertainability
requirement allows the settlor to protect the interests of a particularly
vulnerable class of individuals. 320
The same ex post ascertainability requirement can easily be
transported into the class action through the use of bifurcation
procedures. Using such a procedure would permit the class attorney to
develop the claims for the inchoate class, allowing the class members to
reap the benefit of collective investment without incurring the costs of
searching for the individual class members. In fact, the small claims
plaintiff is particularly analogous to a future interest insofar as neither
would do any investment in the absence of collective management by a
manager.
Moreover, like the relaxed ex post ascertainability requirement in
trust law, some form of ascertainability of the class members would be
required ex post after liability has been established to allow the class
members to individually benefit from the class action. Allowing ex post
ascertainability would also allow the class attorney to avoid the costs of
identification in establishing liability and could push some of the costs to
the class members themselves. Moreover, and in response to the
Supreme Court’s recent concerns, ex post ascertainability would prevent
uninjured parties from recovering. Finally, ex post ascertainability would
not be as urgent in the class action context because, unlike in the trust
context, the class members would have already received the ex ante
benefit of the deterrence provided by the claims. The beneficiaries’
interests in the res do not have an analogous ex ante component.
B.

Settlement Pressure

Federal courts have also expressed concern that the class action places
undue pressure on the defendant to settle, allowing “plaintiffs to extort
large settlements from defendants for meritless claims.” 321 This concern
with “blackmail settlements” is not new 322 and has been used to justify
restrictions on the use of class actions. For example, courts concerned
319. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44 (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (requiring a “definite
beneficiary”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (same).
320. Cf. HESS ET AL., supra note 32, § 168 (noting that “[t]rusts for those of limited capacities are
especially useful and desirable because of their inability to act for themselves,” citing, among
others, minors)
321. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014).
322. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)
(discussing “blackmail settlements” in class actions); see also Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at
1378 & n.3 (citing Judge Friendly and discussing literature on blackmail settlements).
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with blackmail settlements have concluded that a “rigorous analysis” of
each of the class requirements is required, including a review of the
merits to the extent that they overlap with other class certification
requirements. 323
Admittedly, there is no analogue to the defendant in the trust.
However, the trust model strongly suggests that concern with settlement
pressure is misplaced because the settlement pressure created by the
class action is a feature, not a bug. As the model shows, the class action
is used to alleviate a problem of scale suffered by the class members.
Because the interests of the class members are divided, they cannot
invest in common issues at the appropriate scale. In contrast, the
defendant owns the entire liability associated with any common issue,
and thus does not suffer from a problem of scale. Accordingly, the
concern with settlement pressure does not unfairly treat the interests of
the defendant. Instead, it ensures fairness by leveling the playing field. 324
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that so-called “blackmail settlements”
rarely, if ever, occur. 325
C.

Cy Pres Distribution

The trust model is also instructive in addressing cy pres awards in
class actions. Cy pres awards themselves are derived from the law of
charitable trusts 326 and permit a court to “direct the application of the
property . . . to [a] charitable purpose” within the intention of the settlor
if “it is or becomes impossible . . . to carry out” the particular charitable

323. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8, 17, 28 (1st Cir.
2008) (concluding that a review of the plaintiff’s “novel and complex” theory of injury was
necessary to avoid “a doubtful class certification” that puts undue pressure on the defendants to
settle); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 38 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting court
to review merits when it overlapped with the predominance requirement, noting that such evidence
does not prejudice the defendant because “[e]very class action defendant wants its evidence
disputing Rule 23 requirements considered in order to try to fend off the enormous settlement
pressure often arising from certification”); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1955 (2008) (“Courts tempted to deny class certification to guard against
settlement pressure in anemic cases have to determine that the case is indeed anemic and not one
that merits a settlement.”).
324. Campos, Proof, supra note 24, at 777–85.
325. See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2003) (noting that “[e]mpirical researchers . . . dispute the blackmail claim”).
326. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2009)
(using cy pres doctrine to justify the use of a fluid recovery procedure); 4 RUBENSTEIN , supra note
212, § 11:20 (noting that the “disposition of funds that have not been individually distributed, by
distributing them for the next best use which is for indirect class benefit, has been approved under
the equitable power of courts in various cases under the analogous cy pres doctrine”).
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purpose the settlor intended. 327 Indeed, the invocation of the cy pres
doctrine in the class action context strongly suggests that a number of
courts already implicitly use a trust model of the class action.
In the class action context, cy pres awards are typically used when a
portion of any recovery goes unclaimed or class members cannot be
identified. 328 Cy pres issues tend to arise in small claims litigation,
where in many such cases, “the amount of damages that each class
member can expect to recover is probably too small even to warrant the
bother, slight as it may be, of submitting a proof of claim in the class
action proceeding.” 329 Cy pres awards typically go to a charity. 330
Ironically, a trust model of the class action suggests that cy pres
awards to a private third party like a charity may, in many
circumstances, be inappropriate in the class action context because of the
harmful effects they may have on deterrence and compensation.331
Under the trust model, the class action solves a problem of scale by
assigning control over the claims and incentivizing the class attorney to
maximize the total return on those claims. Accordingly, cy pres
distribution may be harmful to the extent that it disrupts this solution.
For example, class counsel may have a relationship with the receiving
charity and thus use her efforts to shift funds to the charity rather than to
the class members. 332 Deterrence may be maintained but the
compensation of the class members would be diminished.
Cy pres awards can also have harmful effects on the other parties
involved in the class action. For example, the court’s relationship to a
receiving charity may cause an undue amount of proceeds to go to the
charity or result in bias against the defendant to increase the amount
recoverable for the charity. 333 In addition, the defendant’s relationship to
the receiving charity may result in benefits to the defendant, such as

327. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
328. See 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 212, § 11:20 (noting that the “disposition of funds that have
not been individually distributed, by distributing them for the next best use which is for indirect
class benefit, has been approved under the equitable power of courts in various cases under the
analogous cy pres doctrine”); In re Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d at 33 (using cy pres
doctrine to justify the use of a fluid recovery procedure).
329. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013).
330. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 111–14
(2014).
331. I thank Martha Minow for clarifying my thoughts on this issue.
332. Wasserman, supra note 330, at 122–24.
333. Id. at 124–25 (2014) (discussing risk of “the appearance of [] impropriety”).
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reputational benefits, that dull the deterrence provided by the
litigation. 334
Accordingly, the trust model suggests that, in considering cy pres
awards, courts should choose a third party for distribution that inherently
has no relationship with the parties. For example, the court could assign
unclaimed funds to future plaintiffs in the form of price reductions, or to
the state or United States Treasury through escheat procedures. 335
CONCLUSION
Throughout this Article I have analogized the class action to the trust,
using trust law as a guide in addressing a number of issues in the law of
class actions. In the course of making the analogy, I identified a
problem—the problem of scale—that justifies the use of the class action
and the trust and explains why they are used despite the potential for
agency costs. The scale benefits of the separation of ownership and
control has been a central focus of the law of class actions,336 while trust
scholarship has not given this benefit much consideration. This suggests
that the class action can provide its own lessons for the trust.

334. Id. at 120–21; see also Marek v. Lane, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (noting in a
statement respecting the denial of certiorari that “Facebook thus insulated itself from all class claims
arising from the Beacon episode by paying plaintiffs’ counsel and the named plaintiffs some $3
million and spending $6.5 million to set up a foundation in which it would play a major role”).
335. 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 289, § 10:17, at 515–16; Wasserman, supra note 323, at 105–14
(discussing “alternatives” to cy pres distribution); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 et seq. (2012)
(permitting escheat of funds to the U.S. Treasury).
336. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02 cmt. a (“The literature on aggregate proceedings is
enormous. Much of it . . . focus[es] on matters like economies of scale and opportunistic behavior
that are common to all [such proceedings].”).

